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INTRODUCTION 
A central banking system is a crucial factor in the growth of every economy. Central banks play a pivotal 
role in the implementation of monetary policies. Initially, these banks were created as autonomous 
institutions, and designed to regulate payment systems. The power of running monetary policies was 
conferred on them only at a later stage. Their functioning was expressed, either in the charters that created 
them or in other legal arrangements. In the past, it has been observed that, in the discharge of their duties, 
some policymakers have tried to interfere with their activities in order to achieve their own objectives. 
This method of operation has sometimes been reflected in monetary expansionary tendencies, which have 
caused harmful effects on the values of currencies, and several economies have been seriously affected as 
a result. This often occurred in periods of large spending by governments, such as general elections. In 
fact, during such periods, some governments do everything possible to meet the electoral pledges that 
they have been unable to implement during the period of their political mandate. After this trend had been 
discerned in some jurisdictions, efforts were made to address the issue. Although the main reason for 
pushing for the legal independence of central banks is to maintain sound monetary policies by avoiding 
expansionary measures to artificially stimulate economy; much of the economic and financial literature 
that prevailed twenty years ago had constantly continued to see ‘politicians using monetary expansion as 
a means of stimulating the economy in the interest of short-term electoral popularity.1 Surprisingly, in 
present days, the same view still lingers, and it is still said that some ‘governments and parliaments are 
tempted to use the printing press to meet their financial needs; thus neglecting the risks and detriments of 
inflation’.2
While this seems to be the essential motive put forward to substantiate the need for the separation of 
political and monetary authorities, some experts are sceptical about this generalization, and one of them 
holds the view that ‘evidence that monetary policy follows the electoral cycle is thin’.
  
3
From the above, it may be inferred that when people express their views on this matter, they should 
exercise caution, and not try to consider expansionary money an evil that is always linked to the electoral 
process alone. 
 In other words, 
every case should be examined on its own merits;, and empirical evidence shown that a government has 
actually indulged in such practices. 
                                                          
1 Ross Cranston Principles of Banking Law 1 ed (1979) 120. 
2 Rosa Maria Lastra ‘Independence of the European System of Central Bank’ (1992) 33 Harvard International Law 
Review 476. 
3 Ibid. 
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Unfortunately, in many jurisdictions around the world, there is a persistent suspicion that political undue 
influence is sometimes exerted on central banks to print money for illegitimate ends. If these allegations 
proved to be true, it would indeed amount to public financial malpractice with a negative impact on 
economy. In such situations, an independent central bank, it is said, would deprive those politicians of the 
temptation to take this easy path;4 since printing of money5
In order to curb such a tendency and other undesirable practices in this area, a number of countries 
including South Africa have set up a series of safeguards; one of them being the inclusion of the 
independence of central banks in their constitutions. In so doing, they have recognised the role expected 
to be played by those institutions,; and decided to ensure that their protection is embedded in the highest 
law of the lLand.(why caps?) In fact, a constitution has been considered by many as a social contract 
between the people themselves as to how they should be governed, on one hand, and the rulers who are 
expected to be limited in their power by that contract, on the other. The values cherished by the people are 
enshrined therein, and it is the duty of governments to uphold them. Therefore, respect for central bank 
independence is an obligation binding both governments and monetary authorities. However, despite the 
existence of that autonomy, central banks are also expected to work in consultation with governments; 
and account for their actions before relevant authorities. 
 is a process that follows strict rules, and 
requires certain standards of macroeconomic variables, such as an increase in production or maintenance 
of full employment, otherwise, the purchasing value of the currency would depreciate; and the primary 
objective of central banks would miss its target. 
The analysis of this concept is the main objective of this short dissertation. Its purpose is to explore the 
legal dimension of the independence of central banks, bearing in mind that the nature of the topic, and the 
areas in which these institutions operate are interdependent; this is why this study will build on the views 
of economists, financial experts and lawyers. In fact, both lawyers and economists play an important role 
in the economic regulatory process. Their close cooperation is useful in the formulation of wise and 
effective regulations. 
Consequently, this dissertation will be tackled within an interdisciplinary perspective because mercantile 
law in general and banking law6
                                                          
4  Ibid. 
 in particular deals with legal aspects of finance, economics and business. 
5 A currency is a potent symbol of a polity’s unity, integrity and perhaps strength. Governments interfere with it at 
their peril (Cranston op cit (n 1) 118).  
6 The law is usually subdivided into two categories, namely public and private law. Public law is that part of law 
which regulates the legal relationship between the State and a subject in which the State acts from a position of 
authority, whereas private law regulates the legal relationship between legal subjects acting on a basis of equality. 
Areas of the law, which in particular are related to trade and commerce, are classified as mercantile law. Some 
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In chapter one, a brief reference to the historical background of central banking in general will give an 
insight into the topic. In chapter two, the general theory of the independence of central banks will be 
considered. The third chapter will deal with the legal independence of the South African Reserve Bank 
(hereinafter called the SARB or the Bank). The concluding remarks will sum up the main ideas developed 
in the dissertation.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mercantile subjects consist largely or entirely of private applied law, for example, the law of partnership and 
insurance law, while others such as tax law are mainly public; company law is an example of mercantile law 
comprising both public and private rules. Banking law is presented as a mercantile law subject and regulates both 
public and private relationships. Public banking law regulates the legal relationship between banks and organs of 
the State, which are in a position of authority, and comprises those legal rules which make provision for control by 
the State of money and activities of banks in particular (An Oelofse UNISA Study Guide Mercantile Law LML-
407-U LWB 7-9 Banking Law and Usage (2002) 4-5).  
With regard to public banking law, Cranston remarked that ‘banking lawyers have taken little interest in central 
banks. Central banking law, at least in the common law countries, has been regarded as a specialized subject, 
mainly for public lawyers. But public lawyers have generally done little, although the debate about the European 
Central Bank is generating a great interest on their part. There is hardly any literature about central banking’ 
(Cranston op cit (n 1) 117). This probably may explain the reason why a number of economists have ventured into 
dealing with the independence of central banks, some with wonderful contributions and others with economic bias.  
However, given the nature and object of central banks, it is also not easy for lawyers specializing in this area, not 
to borrow from economic history, economics and finance to substantiate some legal concepts. Similarly, it is not 
possible for a lawyer involved in banking supervision to ignore the concepts of corporate finance, financial 
engineering (financial innovation) and corporate governance. However, even though the language used in their 
writings may have a smack of economics; finance and commerce, the overall of their literature is expected to have 
a legal perspective.  
Concerning the expansion of banking law, in South Africa, there is a significant literature on banking law in 
general;, and an impressive development of private banking law both in academic writings and judge made law. 
This is probably due to the fact that many legal experts are in agreement with the opinion expressed by Schulze 
that among the phenomena influencing banking law, there is the fact that ‘banking law is not an autonomous 
branch of the law; but rather an application of concepts and techniques of the general law of obligations’. (See, 
WG Schulze ‘The Source of South African Banking law- A twenty first Century Perspective’ (2001) 14 SA MercLJ 
Part I) 439). See also, FR Malan; JT Petrorius & SF du Toit  Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory 
Notes in South  African Law 4 ed (2002) 335. 
Therefore, the law of contracts being wide in scope, so becomes the law related to private banking law. 
Furthermore, Schulze, in describing the principles likely to exercise a decisive influence over the development of 
banking law, declared, inter alia, that other important considerations when studying banking law (…) are the 
fundamental changes taking place in the banking sphere which affect the economics of banking. Some of these 
economic changes, which may have an influence of the development of a future South African banking law, 
include the far greater competitiveness in the bank market and its products: increased asymmetric competition; 
excess capacity in the market and the far reaching impact of technology and financial innovation (ibid). 
With regard to public banking law, as above described by An (or simply,  Oelofse, no initials or firstname is 
necessary when referring to an author for a second time, unless there is more than one author with the same 
surname.) Oelofse, there are also a number of lawyers who have written on public banking law, mainly, in the area 
of banking supervision, money law, money laundering, legal aspects of financial institutions, etc. Therefore, the 
remarks of Cranston (supra), which were relevant some years ago;, and which may still prevail in some other 
countries, may not necessarily apply to South Africa as such. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY AND CENTRAL BANKING 
1.1.1 Role of money in society 
Walter Rogers, an American humorist, once said ‘there have been three great inventions since the 
beginning of time: fire, the wheel and central banking’.7 He certainly forgot the invention of money 
around which central banking systems revolve.8 In fact, at all times, money has occupied a central stage 
in people’s lives. History tells us that money has been linked to religion and, in ancient times, the Romans 
banked in the temples of the goddess Juno, also called Moneta9, the Latin root of the word money.10 This 
practice carried with it another religious dimension in that Roman coins were minted in temples,; and 
sanctified by the priests, an act that made the currency acceptable by society as a reality.11 In this regard, 
Voet also declares that it is well known that ‘the Romans often deposited their things for safe keeping in a 
holy temple… sometimes with bankers and money changers’.12
Similarly, money has become an object of almost universal veneration. Some people are convinced that 
money makes everything possible, and this is probably true if one considers its value of exchange and the 
material enjoyment it brings to those who own it. Consequently, the place it holds in social relations 
explains the need for societies to seek its protection and stability. In this regard, it has been said that 
‘there are few things more important to society than stable money,; and efficient and reliable means of 
transferring it from one person to another’.
 This is probably why banks have always 
been considered sacred institutions from the time of their creation to this day.  
13
                                                          
7 The Economist September 2000 80. 
 
8 In antiquity, money took the form of ornaments, household utensils and tools. In Egypt, circa 2000BC rings, 
anklets, necklaces and bracelets were used extensively as a common means of exchange. The legendary King 
Croesus of Lydia in Asia Minor is generally credited with the honour of introducing a formal and sovereign 
coinage system when official silver and gold coins were struck in his kingdom between the years 560 to 546 BC. 
In Athens, coins were apparently introduced by Solon (638-559) who fixed money payment for fines and dues 
formerly paid in cattle; probably before this time coins had been in use in China. (See, eg, Houston The 
Fundamentals of Money [1935]10; see also ‘Market Intelligence’ [2004] The Nairobi Business and Financial 
Journal 28). 
9 The most important goddess of the Roman state, wife of Jupiter; she was originally an ancient Italian goddess; the 
Greek equivalent is Hera (Jidy Pearsall & Patrick Hanks (eds) The New Oxford Dictionary of English [1998]) 
992. The Latin term moneta came to signify money.you have already mentioned this in the text to foot note 10 
10 Robert W Kolb & Ricardo J Rodriguez Financial Institutions and Markets 2 ed (1996) 38. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Nigel Willis Banking in South Africa (1981) 184. 
13 Guy David ‘Money in Canadian Law’ (1986) The Canadian Bar Review 192. 
Formatted: Font: Italic
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In effect, money is the common denominator in several human transactions, and the means of discharging 
the obligations thereby created.14 From barter to counter-trade, its modern form, people use money as a 
medium of exchange to facilitate transactions,15 as a unit of account which helps determine with precision 
the value of the goods exchanged;, and the services delivered. Money is also a store of value equal to or 
near its face value.16 In this regard, money is any medium, which in practice fulfils the function of 
exchange and which is accepted by those who use it.17 This is why ‘money has evolved from cowrie 
shells (in South Pacific Islands) to cattle (in Africa) to cigarettes (in prisoner-of-war camps) and then to 
gold’.18
As history continues to say, the increase in the volume of trade transactions in ancient times gave rise to 
the need for people to have a safer place to keep their money other than in their homes. In this connection, 
it is said that ‘recourse was hard to some individuals, such as, priests, and wealthy merchants to keep it 
for them in the vaults they had for the safekeeping of their own gold’.
 Among all these forms of money, only gold was easy to handle, divisible and durable; thus it was 
preferred to other kinds of money. 
19
1.1.2 Emergence of central banking 
 The movement led to various 
associations of individuals or legal entities to form banks. From the activities of those banks, which were 
commercial in nature, came the idea of a central banking system that is examined below.  
A central banking system is a recent phenomenon when compared to commercial banking system. 
Commercial banking system is believed to be much older. Its beginning may be traced back to 
somewhere in the Middle Ages, from the European institutions that provided depository safekeeping 
services when, as seen earlier, the goldsmiths and silversmiths having facilities in which to keep their own 
valuable inventories, found that ‘they could earn additional income by storing valuables for a fee’.20
By contrast, the emergence of central banks is located somewhere in the 17
  
th century.21
                                                          
14 Ibid. 
 These banks were 
essentially created to assist their governments with finances. For example, the Bank of England Act 1964 
15 David S Kidwell, Peterson & Blackwell Financial Institutions, Markets and Money 7 ed (2000) 5. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See, Guy op cit (n 13) at 205. 
18 Jerry Jordan ‘Money, Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Global Financial Arena’ (2001) FMF 
Mnograph 27 15. 
19 See, Oelofse op cit (n 6) 22. 
20 Kolb et al op cit (n 10) 404. 
21 Sveriges Riskbank of Sweden was created in 1668; it was followed by the Bank of England in 1694, the Bank de 
France in 1800, the Bank of the Netherlands in 1814, the National Bank of Belgium in 1850, the Bank of Spain in 
1856, the Bank of Russia in 1860, the Bank of Japan in 1882 (Rene du Plessis ‘The Structure and Operations of 
the Reserve Bank and its Relationship with the Government’ (1984) BM 86-93. See also Jeremy Leaman The 
Bundesbank Myth Towards the Critique of Central Bank Independence [2001] 52). 
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authorized the incorporation of the Bank by means of public subscription. Originally, the object of the 
Bank was to raise money required by the war with Louis XIV.22 It is further said that ‘the Bank was 
prohibited from engaging in general trade but was authorized to deal in bills of exchange and in the 
equivalent of promissory notes’.23 The duties of that bank included keeping the accounts of the 
government, issuing banknotes and were also allowed to trade in gold coins, bullion and sliver.24
As private institutions, central banks were created as independent bodies. With time, a number of 
countries, which were satisfied with the way they were handling money, came to realise that they could 
also play a macroeconomic role.
 
25
Furthermore, because of their expertise, they also began to serve as governments’ advisors on financial 
matters. With these new roles, central banks went from strength to strength, which is why it was said that 
‘never before, have central banks reached the pinnacle position and obtained the widespread interest they 
now command’.
 As a result of this realisation, some of them have been entrusted with 
the handling and protection of currencies on behalf of governments. As their function grew in importance, 
central banks were also given the power to formulate monetary policies on behalf of governments. In 
addition to this, they received additional duties, such as, supervision of banks and other financial 
institutions. 
26 It is owing to their role in macroeconomic policy that they are now the focus of a great 
number of researchers in different fields.27 This movement was probably due to financial global 
expansion.28 In fact, since 1973, almost all the nations in the world have been operating fiat monetary 
systems29 in which the goods and services value of a unit of money rises or falls with the parsimony or 
profligacy with which the central bank issues its money.30
                                                          
22 EP Ellinger, Eva Lomnica & Richard Hooley Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law 4 ed (2006) 29.   
  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 When central banks were created, the notion of macro economy as such had not yet appeared. 
26 GM Wessels ‘Cycles in Central Bank independence’ (1997) 12 The South African Journal of Economic History 1 
153.   
27  See, GM Wessels ‘On the Meaning of Central Bank Independence’ (1998) 1 South African Journal of Economic 
and Management Sciences 2 254. 
28
 The global expansion was characterised by the expansion of the European Monetary Union, the former Eastern 
Bloc States, Chile, UK, France, New Zealand and a number of other countries where central banks statutes have 
been amended or completely revised in order to strengthen their independence. The independence of central banks 
received attention in South Africa during the constitution-making phase in that independence was debated and 
eventually included in the Constitution (Jordan op cit  (n 18) 1).  
29 Fiat money is paper money that is backed only by the issuing government’s decree that it is acceptable as legal 
tender currency. Its value stems from public confidence rather than being convertible into gold or other hard 
currency (Thomas Fitch Dictionary of Banking Law 3 ed (1997) 182). Legal tender is the money recognised by 
law as acceptable payment for creditors also called lawful money (Fitch op cit (n 29) 261). It is the money people 
use in their daily businesses, such as banknotes and coins. For further details, see section 17 of the South African 
Reserve Bank Act 89 (Act 90 of 1989) as amended. 
30  Jordan op cit (n 18) 27.  
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This helps maintain the balance in the money supply.31 Nations today no longer provide an anchor to their 
currencies by a legislative declaration of gold value. Therefore, central banks have themselves become 
anchors for the stability of their respective currencies.32 It is on the basis of these considerations that, 
nowadays, a central banking system is entrusted with the duty of formulating and implementing financial 
policies with the ultimate end of protecting the value of the currency and fostering economy. This crucial 
role has resulted in central banks being included by the will of the peoples in the well-cherished values at 
the same level as national symbols, such as flags, national anthems, systems of governments and Bills of 
Rights in constitutional dispensations. It is also because of the claim of national ownership by central 
banks, in some countries, that the appointment of the leadership of those institutions is strictly scrutinised, 
and carried out by governments, sometimes, with the approval of parliaments. All these legal and 
administrative precautionary measures have been designed to avoid any subordination of those 
institutions to governments; because it could facilitate inflation and even hyperinflation,33
 
 which are 
considered a threat to the life of any currency. The theory of the independence of central banks highlights 
this concept even more. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31  The central banking wisdom is that there should be neither too much money in circulation nor too little (see, 
David Colander Economics 1 ed (1994) 278). Central bankers are expected to keep the balance according to the 
moods of the economy.    
 32  Jordan op cit (n 18) 15. 
 33  Inflation is a continual rise in price level. It is also a continuous decline in the value of the money.  Inflation is an 
ongoing rise in the price level; a rise generates another rise in an exponential manner and the spiral is hard to 
stop. Once inflation hits 5 or 6% it is no longer insignificant, inflation of 10% (double digit) or more is 
significant and once it hits triple digits of 100 or more it is called hyperinflation (see, Colander op cit (n 31) 
149). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 THEORY ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF CENTRAL BANKS 
The term ‘independence’ is defined as a state of being free of influence, guidance or control of another or 
others. To be independent is a state of being free from outside control; not depending on another 
authority.34 To be independent is also to act personally without external pressure. Within the context of a 
central banking system, this means autonomy from government.35 It is a restriction made on governments 
against interfering with the handling of monetary policies. In fact, granting independence to central banks 
essentially represents elevating monetary policy to a more consecrated level beyond the fray of politics.36 
As noted previously, since some people think that political interference in the implementation of 
monetary policies weakens the credibility of central banks by restraining their ability to perform in a 
predictable and sound manner, their independence means freedom to execute monetary policies without 
fear of any political retaliation; otherwise, the entrenchment of that independence in constitutions would 
be meaningless. In this regard, it was said that ‘empirical evidence has shown that countries with an 
independent central bank enjoy a low inflation rate and small budget deficit without at the same time 
exhibiting reduced economic growth’.37
In order to strengthen this independence, it has continuously been thought that the power to create 
money,money and the power to spend it should be separated for central banks to operate as a check on 
governments, particularly over its fiscal policies;, and prohibiting the financing of government deficit. In 
this regard, the idea of separation between monetary authorities and governments was mooted in the 19
 
th
                                                          
34  Pearsall op cit (n 9) 928. 
 
century even though its application has taken a long time to gain wide recognition. This will be explained 
in the following section. 
35 The anomaly of the independence of central banks is illustrated by Sayers, who states that the authority of the 
State over the central bank is always necessarily absolute. All that is open to question is the extent to which the 
sovereign body should detail its command to the central bank for the monetary laws are such a command (Gianni 
Tiniolo in Tiniolo (ed) Central Banks’ independence in Historical Perspective (1988) 42). To make sure that this 
command will be obeyed, the Governor of the Central Bank of England and the government negotiated a deal of 
allegiance, which provides that ‘as long as I am the Governor of the Bank, I shall do my utmost to work loyally 
and harmoniously with you and for you as a Chancellor of the Exchequer;, and I shall continue if you allow me 
to tender you such advice as I consider it my duty to offer, fully realize that I must not attempt to impose my 
views on you’ (ibid). This is an example of a bank, which really had its hands tied and was under the direction of 
a Government. However, according to Ellinger, the election of a Labour government in 1997 resulted in two 
momentous changes in banking regulation. First, the Bank of England Act 1998, as well as giving the Bank 
independence in determining monetary policy, also transferred its responsibility for banking regulation to the 
Financial Services Authority (the ‘FSA’). (See, Ellinger et al op cit (n 22) 28). Therefore, the Bank, which was 
nationalized in 1946, and ever since subject to government control, has now recovered its independence.  
36  Ignacio Mass Central Bank Independence, A Critical View from A Developing Country Perspective (1994) 4-5.  
37  Markus Lusser ‘Autonomous Monetary Policy in a Small Country’ (1994) 13 South African Journal of Economic 
and Management Sciences 3. 
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2.1.1 Hallmark of central bank independence 
A distinctive feature of independence of central banks, namely autonomy from governments and non-
financing of budgets, was identified by one of the famous British economists in a paper on the 
establishment of a national bank in England in 1824 in which he stated that ‘the government could not be 
entrusted with the power of issuing paper money that it would most certainly abuse it’.38 For him, to avert 
the danger, commissioners should be allowed to control the use of public finance;, and should not 
authorize the lending of money to governments without proper justification; on the other hand, 
governments should not try to use their dominant power to convince the commissioners to do so. He 
further stated that ‘if the government wanted money, it should be obliged to raise it in the legitimate 
way’,39 such as applying wise fiscal policies or participating in financial markets like any other 
institution, but ‘in no case, should it be allowed to borrow from those who have the power of creating 
money’.40
It is clear from the above that the speaker had in mind a system of checks and balances in the financial 
sector, but his vision that the representatives of the peoples should have a final say in public financial 
management is somehow blurred by the current view that ‘although parliaments once exercised effective 
control of government budgets, today [in many countries], parliamentary control of government’s budget 
is a mere formality rather than a real check’.
 
41
The separation of monetary authorities will shed more light on this concept. 
 Because of this situation, the last hope of the people on 
these matters is placed in the role to be played by an independent central bank. Their expectation is that a 
central bank would not systematically finance deficits; rather, serious studies ; and consultations should 
be conducted to examine the merit of the requests of the government before any disbursement of funds is 
carried out. 
2.1.2 Separation of duties of governments and central banks 
Although the independence of central banks is topical in many countries, it is still a controversial issue. 
Those who advocate the idea of that autonomy tend to compare the legal independence of central banks 
                                                          
38
 BW Fraser Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin Central (1994) 1 www.rba.gov.au/publications and 
Research/Buttein/bu-dec94/bu 1294-1pdf. [Visited 4 May 2004]. This theory has been largely expounded by 
David Ricardo (1772-1823), a British economist and a successful  stockbroker of Dutch-Jewish parentage who is 
also credited with several other economic theories, such as the theory of wages in the economy and the theory of 
comparative advantage in international trade (see, Colander op cit  (n 31) 14, 113-114). 
39  Ibid. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Lastra op cit (n 2) at 77.  
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with the independence of the judiciary. The attempt to use this analogy as an example to separate 
monetary authorities and governments is probably by reference to the traditional system of checks and 
balances between the three traditional branches of power, namely the executive power, the legislative 
power and the judicial power as featured in several constitutions around the world. 
They probably view this mutual control where ‘no one branch can exercise power decisively without the 
support or the acquiescence of the other’42
Another reason, which may lead one to think that the independence of the two institutions is different in 
their essence, is the fact that central banks are part of the executive branch of the state. This is still true 
even in those countries that have opted to ensconce the independence of their central banks in their 
fundamental laws. The framers of those constitutions perhaps never thought that their central banks were 
meant to be the fourth estate of power. Even the press itself has never managed to be elevated to the level 
of a fourth power despite the freedom it enjoys;, and the role it plays in political orientation. 
 as an efficient mode in the conduct of monetary policies and 
another way of fostering decentralisation and avoiding the abuse of power. Although the analogy may be 
somehow self understood because in some countries, independence of the judiciary, and independence of 
central banks are entrenched in their constitutions, the reality is that independence of the judiciary is an 
almost universally accepted concept. On the contrary, the idea of central banks’ independence in 
constitutional systems is a new concept, which does not enjoy universal recognition. The reason being  
that  there are still a number of countries in which the principle of independence of central banks is not 
yet recognised, and where the idea is not even on the agenda of their financial policies. 
Therefore, it is not because the independence of central banks is provided for in some constitutions that 
central banks may consider themselves separate from governments. There are many other state agencies, 
the independence of which is written into constitutions, that are still considered administrative and 
advisory bodies, such as the Financial and Fiscal Commission or the Independent Authority to regulate 
Broadcasting as respectively stipulated in s 220 and s 192 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 108 of 1996; as well as similar institutions in many other countries around the world. 
Furthermore, it is true to say that the courts enjoy the authority of res judicata,43
                                                          
42 Thomas E Patterson American Democracy 5 ed (2001) 44. 
 which gives final 
decisions of the courts a binding character. By contrast, the decisions of central banks do not enjoy the 
43
 The complete expression is res judicata pro veritate habetur meaning that ‘a judgment will have a binding effect 
on another’ (Bryan A Garner (ed) Black’s Law Dictionary 8 ed (2004) 1337); it also means that the judgment that 
has been definitely decided is held as a truth and has a binding character (see, eg, Raymond Gullien & Jean 
Vincent Lexique de Termes Juridiques 5 ed (1981) 373). It is also called ‘judicial precedent’ and by way of 
generalization, judicial precedent may be described as a judicial decision that serves as example and authority for 
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same privileges because central banks, as administrative institutions, may be made to account to relevant 
institutions ; or seek consultation with pertinent administrative bodies. By contrast, the judges do not need 
such kind of consultation in their decision-making process.  
The view that the two forms of independence are different is shared by many; this is why it was said that 
‘the definition referring to a relationship between central bank and government which is comparable to 
the relationship between the judiciary and the government …’ is not helpful44 because this would entail a 
strict separation of powers in the traditional meaning of the word, which would amount to elevate the 
independence of central banks to a level of another power not recognized by law, the comparison simply 
‘suggests a degree of autonomy to be reserved to central banks’.45
From the above, it may be inferred that independence of central banks seems to be more administrative 
than political; administrative in the sense that its main objective is to reinforce the delegation of powers 
conferred on them in consistence with the principle of the division of labour, which consists of organising 
the financial sector into different constituencies to ensure greater efficiency and effectiveness in the 
management of the economy. However, as a general rule, governments retain the big role of conducting 
public affairs, and are primarily accountable for their actions to the peoples through institutions of 
control, such as parliaments in countries where the rule of law prevails; this is why it was said, ‘viewed 
broadly, an elected government in a democratic society has the ultimate power to formulate and 
implement macroeconomic policy and is also responsible for it’.
 
46
To achieve this end, there has to be a regulatory mechanism to avoid conflict and duplication of duties. 
This kind of delegation may be considered a routine matter in any administration or bureaucracy. It is 
sometimes discretionary, but in the case of central banks, the position is different because some of them 
derive their independence from constitutions or statutes of their respective countries. Thus, governments 
have no other alternative but to comply with law. The delegation is thus compulsory, but not 
 In practice, however, it is hard for 
governments to carry out all these tasks alone. Some of them are entrusted to other institutions; or state 
agencies provided those governments retain control, because, as it is commonly said, ‘delegation of 
power without control is improper’. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
deciding a later case, either by the same or by another court. In Latin concept of judicial precedent is embedded in 
the maxim of stare decisis et non quieta movere, meaning to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled points 
(see, Schulze op cit (n 6) at 447). 
44 Philip Brentford ‘Constitutional Aspects of the Independence of the European Central Bank’ (1998) 47 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 88. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Wessels op cit (n 26) at 255. 
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discretionary. However, this does not mean that central banks will cease to be closely associated with the 
general administration whatever their legal status and their degree of independence. 
Furthermore, one of the legislature’s motives in granting that independence is clearly to avoid the misuse 
of authority by governments by compelling central banks to adopt measures that may adversely affect 
their respective currencies  orcurrencies or impact negatively on their overall economies. 
It is beyond dispute that governments also have the interests of the people at heart; but they are comprised 
of human beings with all the weaknesses linked with human nature, for instance, the voters may pile 
pressure on them by claiming to cater for their needs at all costs, especially when elections are around the 
corner. In that event, when they cannot exercise self-restraint;, and resist the temptation of succumbing to 
those pressures, they may act in panic, and use public finance as a vehicle to regain their electoral 
mandate. To avoid this temptation, it was suggested that governments should draw a lesson from 
Ulysses47
Similarly, the legitimacy of independent institutions may also be understood by reference to the 
‘Robinson Crusoe’ paradigm. Just as an individual imposes constraints on himself in order to channel his 
own expedient behaviour towards rationally selected norms,
 of Greek mythology who decided to have his ears plugged with wax to avoid the temptation to 
hear the beautiful melodies of the sirens, which otherwise could have cost him his life.  
48 so a government limits itself by allowing or 
creating autonomous or independent bodies, recognising its own weakness in the face of temptation.49
Where such a restraint proves impossible, governors of central banks and their teams should be able to 
voice their disagreement freely when pressure to print money is unjustifiably imposed on them. In case of 
conflict, the dispute should be resolved by the relevant state agencies in total adherence to due process of 
law. 
 
Otherwise, it may tend to make decisions that exhibit inflationary biases;, and thereby undermine the 
legal independence of central banks. 
                                                          
47 Ulysses (also called Odysseus in Roman mythology) and his sailors plugged their ears with wax to be immune to 
the songs of the sirens which lured unwary sailors to their death. Ulysses asked the sailors to tie him to the mast 
to protect him from the temptation of removing the wax;, and when they were in the middle of the voyage, he was 
tempted to hear the songs and asked the sailors to assist him; his sailors followed his instructions and refused to 
remove the wax from his ears or to release him from the mast. His life was saved because he recognised his 
weakness and protected himself from it. Furthermore, experience teaches that cherished values may be put in 
jeopardy by the passion of the moment. Ulysses tied his own hands but constitutions bind present and future 
generations; a constitution is an attempt by a society to tie its own hands to limit its ability to fall prey to 
weaknesses (see, Erwin Chemerinsky Constitutional Law Principles and Policies 1 ed (1997) 7). 
48  Lastra op cit (n 2) at 479. 
49  Ibid. 
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However, despite the autonomy of central banks, as observed earlier, it is also stressed that ‘an 
independent central bank is not an omnipotent institution devoid of supervision and accountability but a 
part of democratic society’.50 As such, there are limits to its powers and restrictions on the scope of its 
discretionary policy.51 Independence for a central bank does not therefore mean that the bank occupies the 
position of a state within a state; it is impossible to have two sovereign authorities in a single state.52 The 
economic policy of a country cannot be anything but the policy of the elected people.53
In the same vein, it was also said that, ‘although governments have the final say in the management of 
their countries, and none has granted absolute independence to central banks, governments do grant or 
delegate monetary powers to central banks’.
  
54 As the argument goes ‘a mandated independence means 
that the bank is insulated from day to day political interference and short term affinity.55
It is also useful to mention that, even in those countries where the independence of central banks is not 
provided for in constitutions, they are somehow granted charters giving them a certain autonomy allowing 
them to conduct monetary policies in a more relaxed atmosphere, ; and some of them have had impressive 
inflation records. In this regard, it may be said that the success of central banks depends much on an 
effective leadership. For example, Margaret Thatcher was persistently hostile to statutory independence 
for the Bank of England; but under her rule, inflation was kept at a reasonable level.
 
56 This happened 
when there were divergent points of view with her long-serving Chancellor Lord Nigel, who was a keen 
advocate of independence for the Bank of England.57
From a historical point of view and observation, some experts believe that the role of the legal 
independence of central banks rose and declined with the application of economic ideologies, which 
originated from England and expanded to some other parts of the world, as briefly expounded below.  
  
2.1.3 Central bank independence with economic ideologies 
 
According to economic history, there are two important economic theories with regard to how the British 
government approached the conduct of economy in the past and contemporary period; namely classical 
                                                          
50 Wessels op cit (n 26) at 155. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56
  H Preece ‘Right to be wrong’ (1993) 57 Finance Week 10 8.   
57
  Ibid. 
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economy, spearheaded by Adam Smith (1723-1790) under the doctrine of laisser faire;58 and 
interventionist economy developed by John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946). 59
 
 These two concepts have 
had an impact on the legal independence in countries, which applied them beyond the United Kingdom. 
From the above, the perception of many financial experts and economists is that there is no big difference 
between the doctrine of laisser faire long time considered the embodiment of the system of capitalism and 
the basis of freedom of contract and the economic philosophy of interventionalism. Their conclusion is 
based on the fact that Smith does not totally rule out the intervention of government in the management of 
economy,; and Keynes also recognizes the interplay between the forces of the market; as well as a system 
of market oriented economy. However, there is a middle-of-the road theory, essentially developed by the 
so called classic economists,60
 
 and which, currently, is claimed by those who profess it to be the most 
suitable for the conduct of economy  despite its being still controversial in the eyes of many others. 
                                                          
58 In economics and politics, laisser faire (let alone) is a doctrine that economic system functions best when there is 
no interference by government. It is based on the belief that the natural economic order tends, when undisturbed 
by artificial stimulus or regulation, to secure the maximum well being for the individual and therefore for the 
community as a whole (see, Paul Lagasse et al (eds) The Columbia Encyclopedia 6 ed (2000) 1574). Historically, 
laisser faire was a reaction against mercantilism, a system of commercial controls in which industry and trade, 
especially foreign trade, were merely seen as means of strengthening the state. Navigation laws, trade 
monopolies, taxes, paternalist regulations of all kinds bore heavily upon the rising class of merchants in the 
period of European colonial expansion. It was on behalf of this class that the French PHYSIOCRATS, pioneer 
economists in 18th century first formulated the principle of laisser faire. With the physiocrats, state non 
interference became a cardinal teaching; they especially opposed the taxation of commercial pursuits. 
Opposition to mercantilism and state paternalism also motivated Adam Smith, father of classical economics, 
whose name, more than any other, is connected with the British laisser faire doctrine, which he developed after 
his stay in France. Smith believes that individual welfare rather than national power was the correct goal; he thus 
advocated that trade should be free of government restrictions. When individuals were free to pursue self interest, 
the invisible hand of rivalry or competition would become more effective than the state as a regulator of 
economic life. Smith did not believe in laisser faire in an absolute sense; he found a place for government in 
public works, such as the building of canals and docks to facilitate trade and in the regulation of foreign 
commerce to protect certain home industry (ibid). 
59 Some centuries later, another English economist and monetary expert, Keynes John Maynard (supra) came up 
with another theory, which was perceived as departure from classical economy. His position dated from the mid 
1920s, when he formulated the Liberal Party program to promote employment by a program of government 
spending on public works. Keynes came to believe that such a program would increase national purchasing power 
and foster employment in complementary industries. For the sake of full employment, Keynes also modifies the 
classical belief in international free trade. The basis of his doctrine is mainly based on large scale government 
economic planning and the intervention of government in the regulation of economic activities. His doctrine 
appealed to both practical politicians and theoretical economists with equal force; perhaps because he attacked the 
problem of employment and income while remaining faithful to the requirements of rigorous economic thought. 
Although he favored controlled investment and an active public sector, he never waived his faith in capitalist 
economy. In Keynesian theory, government action is designed to stimulate the market, not to eliminate it (see, eg, 
Lagasse op cit (n 58) 1524). 
60 Since the two ideologies exposed above have some convergent points of view, the economists who accept Smith’s 
ideas;, and at the same also recognize some of the ideas of Keynes, are known as ‘Neo Classic Economists’ (see 
Colander op cit (n 31) 318). 
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With regard to independence of central banks, this brief exposition of economic ideologies will help the 
reader understand that the position of those who favour that concept have continued to believe that central 
banks prevailed under the influence of the doctrine of laisser faire; while others think that, nationalisation 
or centralisation of main economic institutions and thereby the subordination of central banks to 
governments, were much influenced by the doctrine of interventionalism. 
 
In fact, a number of countries have been following these theories depending upon the party controlling the 
government of the day. To maintain financial stability, some of them have found that it was good to 
institutionalise a legal framework that permits governments and central banks to act in close cooperation. 
 
In this regard, a few banks have been randomly selected, without any inclination whatsoever  towards 
anyone of the ideologies exposed above, but to simply highlight the importance of granting legal 
independence of central banks in the conduct  of economic and financial affairs. 
 
2.1.4 The Bundesbank 
In Germany, the Central Bank is called the Bundesbank. It has a reputation as a fierce inflation fighter,61 
in large part because of the historical legacy of the German hyperinflation of the late 1920s and early 
1930s.62 Commentators and policymakers are almost unanimous on the fact that ‘the Bundesbank is the 
bastion for price stability and a symbol of monetary discipline around the world’.63 The anti-inflationary 
record of the Bundesbank is typically cited in literature as the quintessential example of the inverse 
relationship between inflation and central bank independence.64
The aim of stability, which became enshrined in the Bundesbank Act of 1957,
   
65
                                                          
61 David Colander Economics 4 ed (2001) 684. 
 was coupled with the 
strong desire of the German people to put an end to a financial crisis that was worsened by the burden of 
the war reparation debt. In their effort to revamp their economies, a series of measures were put in place 
among which the independence of the Bundesbank was prominent. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Maria Rosa Lastra & GP Miller ‘Central Bank in Ordinary and Extraordinary Times’ in Jan  Kleineman (ed) 
Central Bank Independence, The Economic Foundations, The Constitutional Implications and Democratic 
Accountability (1999) 12. 
64 Ibid. 
65 The German Constitution includes some dispositions about the Bundesbank, but does not mention its legal status 
or whether it will be a private or a public body. (See, eg, Felix Olkers Central Bank Law in German and South 
Africa, unpublished LLM dissertation University of Cape Town (1992) 1). 
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The success of the German economy in the above-mentioned period is also largely attributed to the 
combined efforts of the Bundesbank and its predecessor, the Bank Deutscher, which led to a period hailed 
as the miracle years66 during which stable high growth, low inflation, full employment and healthy 
external balances were realised and which was also called a magic square.67
This phenomenon is illustrated by the fact that from the lowest rate of growth in the 1950s, which 
hovered around 3.5 percent up to 1958, the year the Bundesbank Act came into force, the average growth 
for the decade was 8 percent and, for the sixteen years (1951-1966),
 
68 it was still an impressive 6.8 
percent. Inflation averaged less than two percent in 1950 to just one percent in 1960 and the rate of 
unemployment fell.69
There was widespread belief that the success was not only due to the legal independence of the 
Bundesbank but also, particularly, to the teamwork of all political, economic and financial institutions in 
applying positive policies and using top talents to achieve those results.
  
70
In this regard, it was declared that the Bundesbank could lend directly to the Federal and Lander 
governments only to a limited extent and only for a short period.
 This was further strengthened 
by German legislation on the monetary system, which included decisive measures to contain access by the 
state to central bank credit. 
71 The credit lines thus granted could be 
used only for cash advances, that is, to bridge short-term cash deficits that arise during the 
implementation of the budget, but not to finance deficit budgets themselves.72 This is reflected in s 20 of 
the Bundesbank Act, which sets a ceiling on the credit the Bank can grant to government.73 Moreover, the 
Bundesbank may not acquire bonds issued by public authorities direct from the borrower but only in the 
open market on the terms ruling there.74
                                                          
66 Leaman op cit (n 21) 114. 
 
67 In the United States, Humphrey & Hawkins Act on Full Employment and Balanced Growth (1978) translates this 
theory into reality. In fact, apart from the requirement of voting and implementing a balanced budget, the Act 
expressly requires the coordination of economic policy between the president, Congress and the Federal Reserve 
System;, and the setting of 3 percent adult employment as the official target for pubic policy (see, Robert B 
Carson Macroeconomic Issues Today Alternatives, Approaches 4 ed (1987) 180-181). Furthermore, the Act, as it 
stood by that time, explicitly required the nation to aim at four ultimate goals: full employment, growth in 
production, price stability, balance of trade and budget (ibid). 
68 Leaman op cit (n 21) 114. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See, eg, Leaman op cit (n 21) 113. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 See, Lastra op cit (n 2) at 490. 
74 Ibid. 
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In this effort of economic revival, the Bundesbank was also given a rule-making power, that is, it was 
permitted to issue regulations with a binding character through the principle of delegated legislation. 
However, the by-laws passed by the Council of the Bundesbank are subject to the approval of the Federal 
Government, and are published in the Federal Gazette. Therefore, by law, the Bundesbank has both goal 
independence (formulation of monetary policy) and instrumental independence (freedom in the 
implementation of the monetary policy). 
In order to strengthen teamwork, Germany has introduced an element, which is not common in many 
countries, that is, the cooperation between monetary authorities and the government in such a way that 
ministers who are in charge of economic and financial matters and monetary authorities are by statute 
obliged to act as close allies in the handling of economic and monetary policies. For example, the 
members of the Federal Government are entitled to attend meetings of the Central Bank’s Council, even 
though they have no right to vote; they can nonetheless propose motions.75 A reciprocal privilege is 
extended to the Governor of the Bundesbank.76
However, in this innovative style of seeking a synergetic action to achieve high results, ‘there is no formal 
liaison or interchange of staff members, but the Bundesbank and the Ministry of Finance work together 
closely in national and international bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund’.
 
77 This modus 
operandi is in line with the German Central Banking Act of 1957, which provides that ‘the Bundesbank is 
independent from the Government in the conduct of monetary policy; but it must cooperate with the 
Government’.78 Moreover, ‘the Bundesbank needs the Federal Government’s approval in order to 
participate in institutions serving the purposes of supra national policy or international payments and 
lending’.79
In the same perspective, there is another central bank that has achieved success in its own right. This bank 
is the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. 
  
2.1.5 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand was established in 1934.80
                                                          
75  Section 13 (2) of the Bundesbankgesetz. 
 At the time, it was under the tutelage of the 
Bank of England. The Reserve Bank was perceived as an essential tool in the economic development of 
the country and a subject of national pride. It was created as an independent institution under the 
76  Section 13 (3) of the Bundesbankgesetz. 
77  Lastra & Miller op cit (n 63) 488. 
78  Lastra & Miller op cit (n 63) 45. 
79  Ibid. 
80  Geofrey Wood ‘Central Banks independence’ in Jan Kleineman op cit (n 63) 10. 
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inspiration of the then Governor of the Bank of England.81 His idea was presented before the New 
Zealand House of Representatives. Some of the elements of the report are still topical today. The 
recommendations to establish a Reserve Bank were subject to two fundamental conditions. In the first 
place, the bank must be entirely free from both the actual fact and the fear of political interference.82
The Bank would not be able to discharge its duty if its room for manoeuvre were limited. Best practice in 
banking management has shown that to allow a bank to work as a private entity with its own capital 
owned by individuals or corporations with an autonomous board of directors appointed by the 
shareholders would allow the central bank to attain its objectives and realise better performance.  
 
The approximation to the framework of the advisor did not last long because of the advent of a new 
government. In 1936, the Bank was nationalised. The power of monetary policy as provided for in the Act 
creating the Bank Act of 1989 was put in the hands of the Ggovernment; the Bank had to execute the 
directives from the Minister of Finance. It was only in 1984 that the independence of the New Zealand 
Reserve Bank was revived. A series of reforms started to give the Bank back its lost powers. This was 
especially due to continued economic crises. In light of the German miracle, there was a general feeling 
that an independent central bank could better facilitate economic development in New Zealand. 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is currently regulated by the Reserve Bank Act of 1989 No. 157 as 
amended. This new legislation requires the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand to negotiate a 
monetary policy agreement with the Minister of Finance. Under this arrangement, the agreement must be 
made public. Under previous law, this requirement was not present; the Governor could be directed to 
follow a particular policy without that directive being released publicly. Currently, ‘the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand has the very specific goal of pursuing an inflation target of between zero and two percent’.83
This has helped inflation decline from double-digit levels to lower than two percent. Owing to this 
achievement, ‘the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is regarded as a forerunner in establishing institutional 
structures which ensure central bank independence with a formalized performance contract 
arrangement’.
  
84
                                                          
81 Otto Nieyemer was the advisor of the Bank of England; he subsequently became director of the Bank (1938-
1932). 
 In fact, its independence is in the form of a bilateral contract, in which the fight against 
inflation is the object. The Governor commits himself to meeting the targets agreed upon in the contract. 
If the set targets are not achieved, dismissal may occur.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Fraser op cit (n 38) 3. 
84 Jackson MKC ‘Reserve Bank Independence A Post Keynesian Perspective’ (2002) 70. The South African Journal 
of Economics 129. 
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To facilitate the execution of the agreement, the role assigned to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is to 
maintain price stability; other economic objectives are set aside. The Governor, in the implementation of 
this obligation, agrees that he will direct those under him or her towards the achievement of goals 
stipulated in the contract. In fact, he or she has no other choice because of the Sword of Damocles of 
losing his or her job, which hangs over him or her. 
Apart from the Bundesbank and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, there is another institution, which is 
also well known for its independence, namely the European Central Bank, an overview of which is given 
below.  
2.1.6 The European Central Bank 
In the late 1990s, a number of European Union countries formed a monetary union, creating a common 
currency called the euro and a new central bank called the European Central Bank (ECB).85 The primary 
objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability. Its tools and its directives are similar to those of the 
Bundesbank and some experts have considered it an expansion of the Bundesbank for the entire EU.86 
Like the Bundesbank, the decision to uphold that independence is provided for in the Maastricht Treaty.87 
This Treaty has made legal central bank independence a sine qua non for participating in the European 
Monetary Union. It was further provided that ‘in the discharge of its duty, the ECB does not take 
instruction from any quarter whatsoever within the Community’.88
Furthermore, that independence is laid down in the Treaty, member states are imperatively bound to bow 
to its provision. Like other countries, which adopted the independence of central banks in their 
constitutions, the main reason, as seen above, is the fact that they are hard to amend. In fact, to amend a 
multilateral treaty like the EC Treaty is as difficult as to amend any other constitutional provision.
 These provisions strengthen its legal 
independence.  
89 As 
seen earlier, ‘a constitution is the document in which the most important laws of the states are 
authoritatively ordained’.90
                                                          
85 Colander op cit (n 31) 684. 
 This is one of the reasons why it was declared that ‘the member states 
86 See, Colander op cit (n 31) 22. 
87 The Maastricht Treaty is a Treaty on the European Economic Union agreed by the heads of governments of the 
twelve member states of the European Community (Rome Treaty of 1957) at a summit in Maastricht (the 
Netherlands) in December 1991; the ratification was completed in 1993 (Pearsall op cit (n 9) 635). 
88 Ibid. 
89 See, Cranston op cit (n 1) 123. 
90 Brentford op cit (n 44) at 76. 
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undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies 
of the ECB or the national central banks in the performance of their tasks’.91
Consequently, the Bank has no legal or moral obligation to heed any manipulative measure from the 
Community in compliance with Article 107 of the Treaty. According to this treaty, the ECB shall not seek 
or take instruction from the Community or bodies from any government.
 
92 Likewise, the member of state 
is requested not to try to impede the decision-making body, the ECB or the national bank in the 
performance of their duty.93
With regard to the structure and independence, the European Central Bank being a new institution, had 
older institutions from which, perhaps, to draw inspiration, such as the Bundesbank;; but also other 
leading central banks in the world, such as the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States of America or 
the Reserve Bank of South Africa.  
 
Cranston, stressing the importance of  independence of central banks remarked, inter alia, that a central 
bank is in a strong position if its independence is constitutionally guaranteed because constitutions are 
generally speaking less readily amendable than statutes;, and in support of this idea, referred to the South 
African Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank as examples.94
Concerning public financial management, the strictest limit on a central bank financing government is an 
absolute prohibition; this is contemplated in Article 104 of the EC Treaty for the European Union, where 
any form of credit to member states or any other dealings are not allowed.
 
95
A part from the above described central banks, it has been indicated, right from the beginning,  that  the  
Reserve Bank of South Africa is among the first generation of central banks with an extra feature of being 
among the rarest institutions of this kind to have its independence entrenched in the Constitution. 
Therefore, its case will help enhance the comprehension of the topic under consideration as expressed in 
the following chapter. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
91 Cranston op cit (n 1) 123. 
92  See, Cranston op cit (n 1) 122. 
93  Ibid. 
94  See, eg, Cranston (n 1) 122. 
95  Cranston op cit (n 1) 130. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.1 THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK 
3.1.1 Brief overview of historical evolution 
The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 brought huge inflows of foreign capital into South 
Africa.96 This movement brought about a flourishing industry in the region. Because of this, and even 
before, there was a pressing need to organize a financial sector with at the centre, the creation of a central 
bank. The issue was raised several times in many and consecutive years, but every time, the Government 
would dismiss the claim as premature.97
In the long run, at the turn of the 20
 
th
During all those periods of unsuccessful petitions and discussions, one of the main arguments in favour of 
this claim was that ‘a central bank would ensure note circulation, more stable interest rates; trade would 
be fostered and only in times of crisis, a strong bank could serve the State and the public’.
 century, gold mining around Johannesburg had brought about the 
creation of a great number of enterprises in various areas of economic activity. This situation led to the 
creation of a stock of exchange,; and the emergence of a fledging banking industry, which made many 
business people and a number of financial experts to make a fresh call for the creation of a central bank to 
ensure financial coordination. This claim was also based on the adverse effects of the financial and 
monetary crisis, which had arisen in the aftermath of the World War I. 
98
                                                          
96 Financial Mail 30 August 1991 121 9 7. 
 There were 
already other central banks, such as the Bank of Netherlands, the Bank of Java and the Federal Reserve 
Bank in the United States. The existence of these banks contributed to the encouragement of people to 
continue with their agitation to have a central bank; on the other hand, there was also a general 
observation that almost everywhere where central banks had been established, they had stimulated their 
economies and stabilised their currencies. 
97 Gerhard de Kock A History of the South African Reserve Bank (1920-1952) (19 54) 3). 
98 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, at international level, a conference was held in Brussels in 1920 calling on all countries to 
establish a central bank to facilitate the restoration and maintenance of stability in their monetary and 
banking systems and to promote international cooperation.99
Finally, the Government decided to create a central bank, which came to be called the South African 
Reserve Bank.
 
100
Because of this achievement, South Africa prided herself on being ahead of Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand, who had still not yet established their central banks. The legal framework was modelled on that 
of the US Federal Reserve System
  
101, which had been founded seven years earlier, and on that of the 
Bank of Java.102
3.1.2 Creation of the South African Reserve Bank 
 An outline of the creation and structure of the SARB has more to tell.  
The South African Reserve Bank was originally instituted by the Currency and Banking Act 120 (Act No 
31 of 1920) with its seat of office in Pretoria where it commenced its business on 30 June 1921. This 
initial Act required commercial banks to subscribe to a total of 50 percent of the bank’s initial capital. 103 
In terms of the Currency and Banking Amendment Act 22 of 1923, however commercial banks were 
exempted from this obligation.104
 
 This Act was followed by a series of other Amendments, which 
culminated in the setting up of the South African Reserve Bank Act 89 (Act 90 of 1989), and which 
currently governs the Bank. 
The interim constitution, which came into effect on 27 April 1994, deals with the constitutional role 
played by the South African Reserve Bank.105
 
 After a long debate on whether it was convenient to put the 
provisions dealing with the Bank in the new Constitution; or alternatively, if it was to be provided for in 
an ordinary statute. The decision of the Constituent Assembly was that it should be entrenched in the 
Constitution and should be independent. 
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This is how ‘the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996), which came into 
operation on 4 February 1996 (Procl R6 of 24 January 1997),106 confirmed in s 223 that the South African 
Reserve Bank is the central  bank  of South Africa’.107
 
 The independence of the South African Reserve 
Bank is stipulated in s 234 (2), which proclaims that the South African Reserve Bank in pursuit of its 
primary objective must perform its functions independently and without fear, favour or prejudice but 
there must be regular consultation between the Bank and the Cabinet member responsible for national 
financial matters. 
The primary objective of the South African Reserve Bank, as expressed in the preceding paragraph, is laid 
down in s 234(1) of the Constitution,; and is aimed at protecting the value of the currency in the interest 
of a balanced and sustainable economy. In this regard, it is suggested that this section should be read 
together with s 3 of the South African Reserve Bank Act 89 (Act 90 of 1989), in terms of which, the 
primary objective of the Reserve Bank is the promotion of monetary stability and balanced economic 
growth in the Republic.108 The same source indicates that these two sections are essentially the same in 
the sense that both intend to promote monetary stability in the interest of economic growth.109
 
  
The reason of keeping intact the Reserve Bank Act lies in the fact that the Constitution describes the 
objectives and functions of the SARB in broad and general terms leaving the details to be dealt with in an 
Act of Parliament as provided for in s 225. In all likelihood, the enactment of that Act could have 
followed the promulgation of the Constitution; but it is a constitutional practice that when there is a new 
constitution, the laws, which were in force prior to its promulgation, remain in force unless expressly 
repealed by a provision in the constitution. 
 
This is what happened with the South African Reserve Bank Act because s 242 of the Constitution makes 
provision for the preserving of all laws, which were in force immediately before the commencement of 
the Constitution. It also provides for an express abrogation contained in Schedule 7. Since the South 
African Reserve Bank Act was not in that Schedule, the proper construction is that: it was the intention of 
the framers of the Constitution to preserve its existence. This is why the new Constitution was put in 
place, but the missions and functions of the SARB remain the same.110
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3.1.3 Mission, Powers and functions of the SARB 
 
3.1.3.1 Mission 
The term mission also means goal, target or objective; if one looks at the Constitution, the mission of the 
South African Reserve Bank is provided for in s 234 (1). This was later reaffirmed in legal literature that 
in 1990, the Reserve Bank issued a mission statement declaring in unequivocal terms that the main 
objective of monetary policy in South Africa, at all times, is to protect the internal and external value of 
the rand. In this regard, it was further said that the achievement of the mission is carried out through 
monetary policy, which ‘forms part of broader economic policy;, and just as in the case of other policy 
measures, its ultimate objective is the creation of maximum economic growth in a financially stable 
environment to improve the economic welfare of the total population of the country’.111
With regard to the constitutional obligation to maintain sustainable economy as expressed above, it is said 
that an economic growth is sustainable if it lasts, an economy should not be designed to boom and 
subsequently collapse. The Reserve Bank should neither fuel nor suppress economic development but 
should try to lay sound foundation to protect growth.
  
112  In addition, it was also declared that the Reserve 
Bank’s mission statement calls on the Bank to strive for financial stability as a medium term objective. 
Key element in such stability will indeed be a relative absence of both inflation and deflation of the 
general price level.113 In addition, as a general rule, almost all central banks focus on promoting public 
goals, such as economic growth, low inflation and the smooth operation of financial markets.114
Applying the rule within the context of the South African Reserve Bank, it is suggested that focus should 
be on: a moderate rate of expansion credit and the money supply, an orderly and well functioning 
financial market, an orderly payment and money transmission system with built-in safeguards against 
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systemic risk, and a system of sound and well managed banks and other financial institutions that are well 
versed in the monitoring of risks and in risk management.115
3.1.3.2 Powers and Functions 
   
The powers and functions of the South African Reserve Bank are those customarily exercised and 
performed by central banks, which powers and functions must be determined by an Act of Parliament and 
must be exercised or performed subject to the conditions prescribed in terms of that Act as given in s 225 
of the Constitution. 
For the reason previously stated, the powers of the Bank were already determined and  enumerated in s 10 
of the South African Reserve Bank Act 89 (Act 90 of 1989) as amended, and thus, the preservation of this 
Act fulfils the conditions prescribed in s 225 with regard to the Act of Parliament therein ordained. 
Furthermore, apart from these powers, s (11) and s (12) confer on the Reserve Bank powers of inspection 
with respect to banks and mutual banks.116
3.1.4 The structure of the South African Reserve Bank 
 
The structure of the South African Reserve Bank indicates that there is no significant change in the status 
of its initial ownership. The Bank is still a corporate body with its own assets and the right to sue and to 
be sued in its own name. The Reserve Bank, which was created as a public entity from its inception, was 
meant to play a non profit maximizing public interest role, and was established as such under the 
Government of the Union of South Africa. 
Contrary to some belief that the bank is privately owned, the fact that some commercial banks 
participated in its initial capital has not changed its status as a public entity. Even though at this stage, one 
could get the impression that the South African Reserve Bank was a semi autonomous or semi public 
institution, but what happened later, came to change the whole picture because, as indicated earlier, the 
obligation for commercial banks to participate in the capital was later relinquished, and the structure of 
the Board was modified as a result. In reality, keeping those commercial banks on the Board could have 
constituted an embarrassment to the Bank when it would try to discuss matters concerning them.  
Furthermore, the public character of the South African Reserve Bank is also reflected in s 34 of the 
Reserve Bank Act with regards to the allocation of the Bank’s surplus income after certain prescribed 
expenditures have been provided for and dividends from the net profits have been paid to the 
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shareholders.117 This surplus is divided by allocating 10% of it to the Bank’s reserve fund and paying 
90% of it to the Government.118
In addition, the Reserve Bank, which was once described as a relative rarity among central banks because 
its stock was listed at the Stock Exchange of Johannesburg,
 
119
3.1.5 Administration of the Bank 
 is no longer active on this market because 
as from 2 May 2002, it has been delisted. 
The Bank is managed by a board of  fourteen directors, consisting of a Governor, three Deputy Governors 
(one of whom is designed as a Deputy Governor) and three others who are all appointed by the Minister 
of Finance and seven Directors elected by the shareholders (sect 4(1)).120 Of the elected directors, four 
represent commerce and finance, two industries, and one agriculture121 in the sense that they should be, or 
should have been primarily and actively engaged in these various pursuits.122 In this regard, it was further 
observed that ‘the board represents a variety of interests, which will induce the Bank to take all those 
interests into consideration in the formation of its policy and the board does not merely function as an 
instrument of the government’.123
Furthermore, in terms of s 4(2) (a), the Governor must be a person of tested banking experience. 
However, nothing is said about the rest of the governors in relation to their competence and experience. It 
may probably be implied that they should have suitable qualifications.  
  
To preserve the independence of the Bank, nobody may serve as a director if he is a director, officer or 
employee of a bank or a mutual bank, if he or she is not residing in the Republic, or if he or she is a 
Member of Parliament or a member of certain other government institutions as per s 4(2) (a) and s 4. It is 
also specified that no person shall be appointed or elected or remain a director if he or she is a Minister or 
a Deputy Minister in the Government of the Republic or if he or she is a Member of Parliament.  
Furthermore, like the Bundesbank, s 35 of the Reserve Bank Act gives the Board a ruling power to avoid 
bureaucracy of state machinery;, and give the bank flexibility to adjust its operations to changing times,; 
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and also act swiftly in the light of circumstances. This is another way of strengthening its administrative 
independence.  
 
Similarly, in order to achieve high performance in the discharge of its duties, the South African Reserve 
Bank is expected to apply modern techniques of corporate governance to make sure that the interests of 
all the stakeholders are accommodated, ; and are effectively protected in line with the theory of corporate 
law that ‘directors must consider and balance the interest of several constituencies, such as customers, 
employees, creditors, suppliers and the environment, each of which has a legitimate stake in the 
company’s development and activities’.124
3.1.6 Tenure and conditions of office of directors 
  
The independence of the central bank is an abstraction; the reality is the people behind it. It is therefore 
the duty of the law to protect them,; and determine how this independence will be translated into reality. 
One of the measures conceived is the security of tenure of the directors during the period of their office. 
As seen earlier, within the framework of the SARB, the Governor and the Deputy Governors hold office 
for a period of five years,; and the other directors hold office for a period of three years as stipulated in s 5 
of the South African Reserve Bank Act. A director is eligible for reappointment or re-election as the case 
may be after the expiry of his term of office (s 5(2)). This article read together with s 5(3) spells out that 
the directors (including the Governor and Deputy Governors) shall hold office upon such conditions of 
remuneration (including allowances) as may be determined by the Board, and upon such other conditions 
as may be prescribed by regulation. Some observers think that the security of tenure of the directors is 
still to be more clearly defined.  
For example, in the case of the Bundesbank, it is clearly stipulated that the members of the Bundesbank 
Directorate cannot be removed from office before the end of their term; except for reasons which lie in 
their person and if the initiative comes from themselves or the Central Bank Council.125 Concerning the 
period of tenure, the general observation is that ‘a long period of office may induce a lethargic 
management of monetary policy’.126
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of independence’.127
The protection of the Board members of a central bank is favoured by many; for example, some experts 
take the view that to protect the independence of  a central bank, the governor and the board of directors 
should be guaranteed a sufficiently long term of office.
 Therefore, it is not good to change central bank governors every time governments 
change. 
128 Furthermore, it is also maintained that ‘short 
terms of office could make them vulnerable to dim-sighted political pressure because of the uncertainty 
around the possible extension of their appointment’.129
Similarly, it is further observed that in some countries, there is a tendency for some political authorities to 
pick governors who will toe the line,; and act according to their wishes; and fire those who dare to 
legitimately challenge their decisions. This would amount to what Lastra calls appointment on the basis of 
patronage, which according to her, undermines the purpose of independence of central banks.
  
130
However, this issue has remained controversial; as some commentators take the view that ‘the 
independence of the central bank will be enhanced: if the governor is not appointed by government, the 
governor is appointed for more than five years, the board is not appointed by government, or if more than 
half of the board members are appointed independently of government and the board is also appointed for 
more than five years.
 If this 
situation were to be allowed to happen, the independence of central banks would remain a legal idealism 
while the situation is the other way round. 
131
While this general observation may sound correct in some respects, to be realistic, it may not always be 
possible to ignore totally the political aspect in the appointment of governors of central banks; as public 
institutions, most of time, they are anchored in constitutions or statutes of various countries; what is 
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needed is the possibility of selecting and vetting candidates from within or from without political circles; 
and appoint credible people with tested experience, high ethical standards and academic qualifications. 
3.1.7 Financial control and cooperation with the Minister of Finance 
As seen above, cooperation between the Reserve Bank and the Minister in charge of financial matters is a 
constitutional obligation, one of the duties of the latter is to ensure that the finances of the Bank are 
efficiently managed; to reach this target, the shareholders are entitled to elect two firms of public 
accountants to act as auditors of the Reserve Bank in terms of s 30(1) of the South African Reserve Bank 
Act; especially so because in terms of s 31 of the Act, the Reserve Bank also has a duty to inform the 
Minister of Finance about its financial standing. This is mainly carried out through its annual financial 
statements. 
In this connection, it is further maintained that any imperfection noticed in the management of the Bbank 
by the Minister of Finance may be drawn to the attention of the Reserve Bank and the Board, which are 
obliged to remedy the default. If the Board does not comply, the minister may apply to the Supreme Court 
for an order to compel the Reserve Bank to remedy the default in accordance with s 37 of the Reserve 
Bank Act 89 (Act 90 of 1989) as amended.   
In addition, the Minister of Finance may, at any time, cause an investigation to be made into the affairs of 
the South African Reserve Bank by one or more officers of the Department of Finance as per s 30(2) of 
the South African Reserve Bank Act. The providing of the information constitutes a kind of 
accountability by the authorities of the Reserve Bank to the Executive Branch of the State.  
3.1.8 Inflation targeting by the South African Reserve Bank 
The mainstream of experts in this area is in agreement that curbing inflation is not the only 
macroeconomic variable used to maintain growth and sustainable economy. However, they also recognize 
that it remains one of the major aspects of economic and financial stability. This is why many countries 
attach great importance on that. For example, the agreement between the Government of New Zealand 
and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is premised on inflation targeting. Similarly, the granting of 
independence to the Bundesbank was an attempt to fight against hyperinflation, which prevailed in the 
country. 
Furthermore, experts are also unanimous that inflation is a wild animal to be tamed by all means. Since 
central banks are generally entrusted with the carrying out of this task, it is therefore the duty of every 
governor with his or her team to meet the primary objective of their respective institutions. In this regard, 
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in the context of the SARB, it was declared that ‘within the framework of its anti inflationary strategy, the 
Bank has continued its practice of setting year to year target, now called guidelines’.132 Although these 
guidelines were informal in their nature, it appears that ‘South Africa formally adopted an inflation target 
monetary policy on February 2000 when the Minister of Finance announced an inflation of  three to six 
percent to be achieved by 2002’.133
The same source reveals that ‘this came as a result of a creeping inflation and an increase in external 
deficits that were to be brought under control through restrictive monetary policy’.
 
134 Even though this 
was a political statement, and not a legal enactment, nevertheless, it has had a positive impact at 
international level because currently ‘South Africa is categorized as an inflation targeting country135 and 
listed among the countries with full-fledged inflation policies’.136
3.1.9 Financing of deficit by the South African Reserve Bank 
  
 
Financing deficit of governments by central banks has always been a vexed issue, some experts consider 
that it should be prohibited at all cost, others estimate that it should be tolerated, but their common view is 
that it should preferably be avoided or in the event of extreme necessity, when other means have proved 
impossible, it should be strictly regulated. Within the framework of the South Africa Reserve Bank, it was 
said that the adoption of a more market oriented approach in implementing monetary policy in the 1980s 
led to the extensive use of public debt management by the Bank in close cooperation with the Treasury.137 
In this connection, it was also declared that the objective of debt management operations is to finance “the 
so called “deficit before borrowing and debt repayment” of the Exchequer in a non-inflationary manner, 
as well as to exert better control over liquidity in the economy.138
 
 
However, it is convenient to make it clear that funding deficit does not necessarily mean printing money 
because the general observation is that monetisation of government debt occurs when any deficit in a 
government budget is funded directly (normally by printing money) by the central bank. A deficit itself 
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does not therefore imply monetisation of government debt. For example, the central bank may use its 
reserves or recommend recourse to other means of outsourcing of the required funds to plug the shortage. 
In addition, the South African Reserve Bank holds current accounts for State departments and other 
government bodies and institutions.139 In this capacity, ‘it operates as a commercial bank for the State and 
its agencies. Instruments of payment from those institutions are collected and honoured by the Bank. The 
Bank grants loans and advances to the State’.140 It derives this power from s 10(f) of the South Africa 
Reserve Bank Act. Furthermore, the South African Reserve Bank acts as an agent and an advisor to the 
government.141
One of the ways often suggested is the raising of money in the open market; this practice entails the 
buying and the selling of government securities by the Reserve Bank in the open market at the Bank’s 
discretion in order to regulate the money supply or pattern of the interest rate.
 Therefore, it is expected that if the situation of funding deficit could arise, the Bank would 
be in a better position to advise the government to adopt proper financial structural adjustments in this 
sector. 
142 It is further explained 
that these transactions are called open market operations because the Bank is prepared to deal with any 
interested party.143 Although these transactions are generally [emphasis added] undertaken to achieve 
long term monetary objectives, a secondary objective may be to iron out temporary money market 
fluctuations caused for example, by agricultural crop financing, tax payment to the Exchequer or change 
in the net gold and other foreign reserves.144
Similarly, by way of comparison, in most industrialised countries, whether formally recognising the idea 
of the independence of central banks or not, it is said that ‘government’s access to borrowing from the 
central bank is governed both by central bank laws and regulations implementing them’.
  
145 A prohibition 
or limitation on financing the public sector’s deficits or monetising public debt is a classic indication of 
the economic independence of central banks.146 In addition, limiting the extent to which central banks can 
finance the government acts as a brake on the latter’s budgetary policies, and encourages economic 
rectitude.147
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For example, in Germany, the Bundesbank can intervene when the government is confronted with a 
temporary shortage of liquidity and establish the ceiling beyond which the Bundesbank can grant credit to 
government. While financing a deficit is the sovereign decision of every country, it is clear that there has 
to be a legal framework defining this practice. This avoids situations where deficits have led some 
countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, to a structural inflation almost impossible to absorb.148
Furthermore, it is believed that one of the reasons that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is pushing 
the cause of central banks independence among its member states is to encourage and maintain acceptable 
financial benchmarks and avoid funding inflationary budget deficits.
 
149
3.1.10 External Cooperation and debt management 
 
The South African Reserve Bank maintains internal relations with other central banks and international 
financial institutions especially the Institutions of Bretton Woods. For example, the Governor of the 
Reserve Bank is the South African representative on the Board of Governors of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), commonly known as the World Bank. One of the objectives of 
this institution is the encouragement of capital formation and provision of technical assistance to the 
developing countries.150
Likewise, it is also said that there is a close cooperation between the South African Reserve Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is generally concerned with financial arrangement and 
assistance within state members. The South African Reserve Bank is actively involved in regular 
consultations conducted by the Fund’s staff with South Africa as a part of their surveillance of member 
state economies. The Bank administers South Africa’s accounts with the IMF.
 This may perhaps constitute another source of getting money in the form of 
subsidies or loans to face temporary shortages of cash,; or turn the economy around in times of crisis. 
151
However, some critics have charged that the IMF has required recipients of its loans to follow economic 
policies, such as tight monetary policies and fiscal cut backs that have turned to be ill-advised.
 The same grants or 
loans, like the ones expected from the World Bank, may be provided in case of necessity. 
152
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receiving the loans, rather than the average person.153 The loan granted in 1998 to Russia was referred to 
as an example.154
In the same breath, the South African Reserve Bank also became a member of the Bank of International 
Settlement (BIS) on June 1971. The BIS was established in order to increase the cooperation between 
central banks and to act as an agent in respect of international payments.
 
155 The importance of this 
institution as a centre of international monetary cooperation and research has increased considerably 
during recent years. Within this framework, central bank governors meet regularly to exchange ideas,; 
and discuss about monetary current issues. Those meetings may sometimes culminate in joint action and 
in assistance to cope with emergency where it arises.156
3.1.11 The Financial and Fiscal Commission 
 This institution may also constitute another source 
of funding and a proper forum of exchange of ideas in the event of crisis. 
Generally, fiscal policy and monetary policy are two sides of the same coin. Although the Reserve Bank 
formulates and monitors money supply in the economy, the collection of taxes belongs to the 
Government. This is the reason why their harmonious cooperation helps combat inflation on several 
fronts, thereby preserving the integrity of the national currency and promoting economic growth as 
required by the Constitution. 
The Constitution of South Africa recognises this in ss 220-222 by creating the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission in charge of making sure the two policies converge in the efficient handling of financial 
matters. ‘It is also said that the Commission makes recommendations to both Parliament and the 
provincial legislatures. This removes the impression that people have that the South African Reserve 
Bank works in isolation from fiscal and other macroeconomic goals of government’.157
 
 The independence 
of the central bank in financing debt will depend on the outcome of the deliberations of the Commission.  
3.1.12 Accountability and transparency 
3.1.12.1 Accountability 
Before examining the accountability within the South African Reserve system, it is convenient to get a 
clear notion of the principle,; and see how it is applied in some other jurisdictions. In fact, accountability 
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is the quality or state of having someone to report to, or of being answerable to somebody. Someone is 
accountable when he or she has been given a free hand to do what he or she is required to do, but is still 
expected to explain his actions and decisions to an accounting authority. Within the context of state 
officials, accountability is the ability of the public to hold government officials responsible for their 
actions.158
One of the aspects of accountability is the formal duty to justify what has been done. In its Code of Good 
practice on Transparency (Section IV), the International Monetary Fund (2000) argues that officials of the 
central bank should be available to appear before a designated public authority to report on the conduct of 
monetary policy, explain the policy objectives(s) of their institution, describe their performance in 
achieving their objectives and as appropriate, exchange views on the state of economy and financial 
system.
 
159
Similarly, within the framework of the European Union, it is also observed that ‘although independence is 
one side of the coin, a central bank also must be accountable in a democratic state’.
 
160 It was further 
maintained that such accountability should be diversified, including both parliamentary control and 
control by the executive and judicial bodies.161
3.1.12.2 Accountability before executive organs of the state 
 
With regard to accountability to executive body, it is said that to avoid undemocratic state within a state, 
the central bank should provide certain information, reports and advice to the government upon 
demand.162 There are a number of countries where such accountability is applied, such as Germany, the 
United States, and the European Union. For example, the Maastricht Treaty stipulates that the ECB shall 
provide quarterly and annual reports, as well as weekly consolidated financial statements to EC bodies. 
These reports are to be made available to interested parties free of charge.163
3.1.12.3 Accountability before legislative bodies 
 
 
Accountability to legislative body means that the central bank should provide an ex post justification of 
its actions. Parliament would not be allowed to change decisions that are made legally, and therefore, its 
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supervision would mean that the central bank must simply account for its actions both before parliament 
and in front of the country.164
In the context of the Reserve Bank of South Africa, the exchange of ideas is generally carried out at the 
level of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee acting on behalf of the House. It may ordinarily result in a 
praise to the Bank if the representatives of the people are satisfied by the work, or a reprimand if they are 
not. Corrective measures may be recommended by the House and the Governor (who bears administrative 
responsibility) and the Minister of Finance (who bears political responsibility) cannot ignore them with 
impunity. 
 
3.1.12.4 Accountability to judicial institutions 
With regard to accountability before the judiciary, there is no Court of Auditors in South Africa, like it is 
the case in the European Union165
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; much of the Republic financial control is carried out by the Office of 
the Auditor General as per s 188 of the Constitution. Although there is no accountability before judicial 
institution, this does not weaken the capacity of control by Auditor General. In addition, in s 188 (2) (a) it  
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  Within the context of the European central banking system, it is declared that ‘the judiciary should control the 
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among the Supreme Audit Institutions on government auditing. Its Headquarters are in Vienna. Furthermore, in 
Article 2, it is specified that ‘INTOSAI shall maintain its present link with the United Nations Organization’ 
(http/www.intosai.org./en/portal/about us/statutes/index.php?article pos =1). [Visited on 29 June 27, 2009]).  
In addition, Article 1 (supra) also specifies, inter alia, that participation as a full member in its organs and 
exercise of functions are open to the Supreme Audit Institutions of all countries, which are members of the 
United States Organization or any Specialized Agencies,; and the Supreme Audit Institutions of those supra 
national organizations, which are subject of international law,; and endowed with a legal status and an 
appropriate degree of economic, technical/organization of financial integration (ibid). In countries where courts 
of auditors exist, central banks, like any other legal entity in which the state has full ownership or is a leading 
shareholder, are audited by those courts;, and before the passing of the financial bills of the year, the reports of 
the Courts of Accounts are sent to Head of States or Governments;, and then presented to parliaments with 
ample coverage by the media for the pubic to be informed about the overall management of public finance (see, 
eg, Maurice Duverger op cit (n 65) 415). Judges at those institutions are mostly highly qualified and 
experienced former civil servants from the Ministry of Finance, experienced accountants and lawyers 
specializing in financial law. On top of ensuring the auditing of public accounts, those courts are also 
empowered to judge all public accountants with regard to proper handling of the funds in various ministerial 
departments. For example, in France, the Court of Accounts is a prestigious institution and it is provided for in 
Article 47 of the Constitution of 1958 as amended, which proclaims, inter alia, that the Court of Accounts 
(Court des Comptes) assists Parliament and the Government in the control of the proper implementation of 
public budgets voted every year. The main duties of the Court are to conduct financial audits of accounts, 
conduct good governance audits, and provide information and advice to Parliament and Administration (ibid). 
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is said that the General Auditor has jurisdiction on any institution funded from the National Revenue 
Fund or a Provincial Revenue Fund or by a municipality; or (b) any institution that is authorized in terms 
of any law to receive money for a public purpose. Furthermore, in terms of s 188 (3), the Auditor-General 
must also submit audit reports to any legislature that has a direct interest in the audit, and to any other 
authority prescribed by national legislation. In view of this, there are many common features in the two 
systems, and the end result seems to be the providing of information to the legislatures that represent 
taxpayers. Therefore, the above exposition of the functioning of courts of accounts is simply given in 
comparative perspective. 
3.1.12.5 Accountability and election of monetary authorities 
Accountability and transparency are closely related to democratic doctrines stipulated in most 
constitutions. A constitution defines different organs of a State and their mode of cooperation in the best 
interest of the people. When people vote for their leaders, they expect better services and visionary 
leadership. A leadership that is capable of building up strategies of prudence, promotes good governance, 
and upholds the rule of law; if they do not, they should be brought to account before the relevant 
authority. As such, ‘governments must first and foremost be held accountable by the people themselves in 
any given country’.166 It is also maintained that ‘people will have confidence in public institutions only if 
they can be assured of their honesty and of being served in a transparent manner, and if there are 
mechanisms through which they can hold governments accountable’.167
It is true to declare that in a representative democracy, the elected are responsible to the public, which 
holds them accountable, at least through the electoral process; a fact, which is not applied to monetary 
authorities. Consequently, there is a current opinion holding that those monetary authorities should also 
be elected and raise a number of issues; as one expert puts it ‘can it be right that a bank governor not 
elected by the people and not answerable to voters at all, has so much power over them and their lives?’
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It is not only in South Africa where the issue is raised; this was also the case in the European central 
banking system where it is reported that ‘the main argument against central bank independence is that an 
institution, which is free from the direct effect of political control, lacks democratic legitimacy’.169
                                                          
166
 Bience Ganawas ‘The Role of the Ombudsman’ The World Bank Comprehensive Legal and Judicial 
Development towards an Agenda for a Justice and Equitable Society in the 21st Century’, in RV van Puymbroeck 
(ed) (2000) 45. 
  
167  Ibid. 
168  H Preece ‘Central Questions Does SA Want a Reserve Bank Independent of Government?’ (1991) 49 Financial 
Week 7 16.  
169  Lastra op cit (n 2) at 478. 
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In South Africa, this issue was in the air before the existence of the Constitution.170 It still lingers even 
after the promulgation of the Constitution. This means that the issue still remains controversial;, and 
every group provides its own reasons for supporting or opposing the idea. The South African monetary 
authorities are aware of the criticism.171 The answer provided by some of them to justify their non-
election is once again by way of analogy to the judiciary; in this connection, it has been said that ‘some 
governmental agencies enjoy independence even though, in general, their members are not submitted to 
elections like politicians; there are plenty of other areas of national life where decision making is 
delegated to independent but unelected officials; the judiciary is a prime example’.172
Despite the legal independence of the Bank, the authorities are also aware that ‘independence does not 
mean lack of accountability’. According to some of them, ‘no central bank can totally be independent in 
the sense that it is not answerable to anyone’;
 
173 it is further argued that ‘even the most autonomous 
central bank has to report in some form or another to the legislature, which in any case has the ultimate 
power to change the laws governing the central bank’.174
Finally, while a country may make an option of a representative democracy in which the people 
participate in the decision making not directly but indirectly through the election of officials to represent 
their interests,
 Another perceived danger by those who are 
against electing them is the fact that elected monetary authorities may be subservient to people who have 
funded their campaigns instead of acting independently and transparently. 
175 not all institutions are submitted to this process. For example, under the American 
Constitution, it is declared that ‘the framers, after long debates over this issue, decided that federal judges 
and justices would rather be appointed than elected’.176 They would be nominated by the President, ; and 
confirmed through the approval of the Senate. Once confirmed, they would hold office during good 
behaviour. In effect, they would be allowed to hold office for life unless they committed a crime.177
While some current opinion holds the view that central bankers should be appointed, not elected;, and 
probably approved by parliaments, there is no example in the world where governors are allowed to hold 
their office for life like judges; rather, their tenure is of a limited duration; their professional guarantees 
 This 
is probably not the kind of guarantee sought for central bankers. 
                                                          
170 There is a group opinion which thinks that ‘all institutions controlling or influencing policy must be under 
democratic control, and is sharply opposed to the privatization of the SARB (see, eg, H Preece op cit (n 56) 57). 
171  Tito T Mboweni ‘Central Bank Independence’ (2004) BIS Review 88. 
172  Mboweni op cit (n 171) at 4. 
173  Ibid. 
174  Ibid. 
175  Patterson op cit (n 158) 50. 
176  Patterson op cit (n 158) 51. 
177  Ibid. 
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should therefore remain within that period. In the final analysis, it was also said that the judiciary should 
be more of a guardian institution.178
However, in general, there are some experts who think that there are still some shortcomings in the way 
the South African Reserve Bank is made accountable. In their opinion, the Bank should be given a legal 
framework that would lead to more accountability and transparency and that the South African Reserve 
Bank does not as yet prescribe a completely transparent framework for monetary policy
 Similarly, central banks may also be considered guardian institutions, 
with members probably not needing to be elected. Whether elected or not, what is expected from all of 
them is accountability and transparency as public trustees. 
179 on the grounds 
that ‘the Act does not specify what level of inflation offers sufficient price stability, and does not specify 
the benchmarks against which the performance of the South African Reserve Bank can be judged when 
called before Parliament’.180
3.1.13 Transparency 
 For them, the pronouncements of relevant monetary authorities on the level 
of inflation should be translated into statutory or administrative guidelines to give them a compelling 
character. 
In some financial or political literature, the terms accountability and transparency are used 
interchangeably, but while accountability compels fiduciary authorities to appear before relevant 
authorities and bodies, transparency is concerned with the reporting of essential information to the public 
so that people may know what is going on in their departments. The common perception is that people 
who are in charge of the implementation of monetary policies should not only keep account of their 
actions, ; but also provide some financial information. Within the framework of the South African 
Reserve Bank, the term transparency is a vital tool for fulfilling this accountability requirement. The 
rationale is that the essential actions and strategies of the South African Reserve Bank should be 
communicated to the public in general, and to its clientele in particular. In this way, it is thought that the 
South African Reserve Bank will be able to retain broader public support,; and will help the financial 
market operate more efficiently. 
In this regard, as seen earlier, pursuant to s 31 and s 32 of the South African Reserve Bank Act, the 
Governor must submit an annual report relating to the implementation of monetary policy by the Bank to 
the Minister in charge of national financial matters; at the same time, he must furnish detailed information 
to the Department of Finance and to Parliament concerning the financial activities of the Bank. Some 
information, such as statements of assets and liabilities, must be sent on a monthly basis. The Department 
                                                          
178  Ibid. 
179 Casteleijin op cit (n 133) 213. 
180 Ibid. 
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of Finance has a duty to publish every return received annually from the Bank in the Government Gazette. 
It is further stated that although the Governor sends his report to Parliament, the Minister must as well do 
so to Parliament; he must present a copy of the report sent annually to him by the Governor within 
fourteen days after its reception, if Parliament is then in ordinary session, or within fourteen days after the 
commencement of its next ordinary session as per s 32(3). By informing the people, the public can help 
shape up the formulation and implementation of delivery of monetary policy. This is a way to keep the 
public informed about the financial situation of the South African Reserve Bank and providing 
opportunity to the Government to monitor the activities of the Bank. The Government must make sure 
that the Bank acts within the limitation of the Reserve Bank Act.181
 
  
Conclusion 
This work has explored essential elements of the legal foundations of the independence of central banks 
in general, and the legal independence of the South African Reserve Bank in particular. The common 
denominator of the mission of central banks is to keep inflation under control. A central bank, also called 
reserve bank in some countries, is an institution in charge of monetary policy of a given country. The 
primary objective to achieve this is the maintenance of price stability; in other words, it is fight against 
inflation on a continuous basis. To allow central banks reach this goal, many countries have granted 
certain degree of autonomy by delegating some powers to them. In some others, such autonomy is 
reflected in constitutions, others in charters or statutes.  
The main idea of the independence of central bank is to invite the relevant authorities to exercise self 
restraint. These institutions must also make sure that there are no reckless and fraudulent practices likely 
to affect the stability of currencies of their countries. Central banks must also make sure that the 
borrowing by governments follows certain and clear criteria, and guidelines to avoid unnecessary 
expenditure. An overview of some institutions, such as the European Central Bank, the Bundesbank, the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand have been made,; and the maintenance of price stability is their main 
common denominator as well as the conduct of their activities with a certain degree of autonomy. But 
given the nature of the institution and state structure and functioning, the authorities of those institutions 
have a duty to cooperate with their respective governments for more coordination in this area. 
With regard to the South African Reserve Bank, its independence is rooted in the Constitution. This 
means that the people of South Africa have found this independence to be a value to be protected at a 
higher level, that is, the Constitution. This is especially due to the fact that the Constitution is not easily 
                                                          
181 See, Oelofse op cit (n 6) 245. 
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amendable. In the event of any amendment, which is always possible due to the inherent constituent 
power of the people to change the Constitution as they think fit, there should be a compelling reason for 
doing so. In the same breath, the people should also make sure that the independence is effectively 
implemented and, at the other end of the spectrum, check whether the Bank has not abused that power. In 
order to make effective its independence, the Bank was given the power to formulate and implement 
monetary policy, while the Executive Branch of the State determines and implements fiscal policy. For 
harmonious functioning among monetary authorities, regular consultations are held between the Minister 
of Finance, the Governor and other relevant ministries. All these meetings on monetary and fiscal policies 
are coordinated and different opinions are taken into consideration for the smooth running of the overall 
economy. The legal independence of the South African Reserve Bank requires that the financial 
objectives should be clearly defined in law. The purpose of this clarity is to afford the South African 
Reserve Bank the opportunity to react efficiently when the economy sends wrong signals,; and thereafter 
come up with appropriate solutions in due time. The legal independence of the South African Reserve 
Bank also means that the Bank has its own structures, and is allowed to cooperate with the government in 
setting up its monetary targets as well as having the instruments to achieve them. It also signifies that the 
Bank will not be forced to finance budget deficits without justification,; and will be given latitude to 
screen and appoint highly qualified people to administer the Bank without any interference. 
The independence means that the Governors and the Board should have security of tenure during their 
mandate so that they may feel little political pressure, if any, in the discharge of their duties. The work has 
also outlined that the Bank is not a power within a power; it should be considered a guardian institution 
for the life of the currency and for the sake of a healthy economy. Despite its legal independence, the 
Bank is also expected to account for its actions before Parliament,; and it has a duty to report and 
communicate pertinent information to the public, bearing in mind that, in its capacity as a bank, it is also 
held to the banking duty of confidentiality in terms of s 33 of the Reserve Bank Act. It should not, 
however, hide behind this to withhold crucial information needed by different bodies. Although central 
banks are granted legal independence, the reality is that they do not operate in vacuum; they follow 
macroeconomic policies and targets set up by their governments; while the judiciary may take an 
independent position vis a vis the Ggovernment; it is not so easy for the Governor to take the same stand 
because the Constitution requires him or her to work in consultation with the government. 
The independence of central banks may be understood within the concept of the division of labour for 
efficiency and effectiveness. The Government and the Bank should work as close allies because both of 
them act as agents; the real masters are the people they serve. It has been shown that the legal foundation 
of the independence of central banks is either in constitutions, in charters or in other contractual 
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arrangements. In this regard, it is said that however elegantly worded or drafted, the legal stipulation may 
be dead letters if the government’s attitude or the general socio political climate do not support it. The 
(officially required) objective, recommendations and advice of the central bank will have no practical 
relevance if, in practice, they are not accepted by government. What is more important is a deeply rooted 
respect and a reputation for objectivity and technical competence on the part of the central bank to resist 
the pressure of political expedience.182
                                                          
182 See, Wessels op cit (n 26) at 262. 
 But whether a bank is independent or not, the reality is that it is 
not severed from the executive branch, which assumes the ultimate responsibility of the nation. 
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Appendix One: List of main abbreviations used in the work 
SARB    The South African Reserve Bank. 
ECB    The European Central Bank. 
  
ii 
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Appendix Two: List of main statutes 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No 106 of 1996. 
The South African Reserve Bank Act No 90 of 1989 as amended. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A central banking system is a crucial factor in the growth of every economy. Central banks play a pivotal 
role in the implementation of monetary policies. Initially, these banks were created as autonomous 
institutions, and designed to regulate payment systems. The power of running monetary policies was 
conferred on them only at a later stage. Their functioning was expressed, either in the charters that created 
them or in other legal arrangements. In the past, it has been observed that, in the discharge of their duties, 
some policymakers have tried to interfere with their activities in order to achieve their own objectives. 
This method of operation has sometimes been reflected in monetary expansionary tendencies, which have 
caused harmful effects on the values of currencies, and several economies have been seriously affected as 
a result. This often occurred in periods of large spending by governments, such as general elections. In 
fact, during such periods, some governments do everything possible to meet the electoral pledges that 
they have been unable to implement during the period of their political mandate. After this trend had been 
discerned in some jurisdictions, efforts were made to address the issue. Although the main reason for 
pushing for the legal independence of central banks is to maintain sound monetary policies by avoiding 
expansionary measures to artificially stimulate economy; much of the economic and financial literature 
that prevailed twenty years ago had constantly continued to see ‘politicians using monetary expansion as 
a means of stimulating the economy in the interest of short-term electoral popularity.1 Surprisingly, in 
present days, the same view still lingers, and it is still said that some ‘governments and parliaments are 
tempted to use the printing press to meet their financial needs; thus neglecting the risks and detriments of 
inflation’.2
While this seems to be the essential motive put forward to substantiate the need for the separation of 
political and monetary authorities, some experts are sceptical about this generalization, and one of them 
holds the view that ‘evidence that monetary policy follows the electoral cycle is thin’.
  
3
From the above, it may be inferred that when people express their views on this matter, they should 
exercise caution, and not try to consider expansionary money an evil that is always linked to the electoral 
process alone. 
 In other words, 
every case should be examined on its own merits;, and empirical evidence shown that a government has 
actually indulged in such practices. 
                                                          
1 Ross Cranston Principles of Banking Law 1 ed (1979) 120. 
2 Rosa Maria Lastra ‘Independence of the European System of Central Bank’ (1992) 33 Harvard International Law 
Review 476. 
3 Ibid. 
 2 
Unfortunately, in many jurisdictions around the world, there is a persistent suspicion that political undue 
influence is sometimes exerted on central banks to print money for illegitimate ends. If these allegations 
proved to be true, it would indeed amount to public financial malpractice with a negative impact on 
economy. In such situations, an independent central bank, it is said, would deprive those politicians of the 
temptation to take this easy path;4 since printing of money5
In order to curb such a tendency and other undesirable practices in this area, a number of countries 
including South Africa have set up a series of safeguards; one of them being the inclusion of the 
independence of central banks in their constitutions. In so doing, they have recognised the role expected 
to be played by those institutions,; and decided to ensure that their protection is embedded in the highest 
law of the lLand.(why caps?) In fact, a constitution has been considered by many as a social contract 
between the people themselves as to how they should be governed, on one hand, and the rulers who are 
expected to be limited in their power by that contract, on the other. The values cherished by the people are 
enshrined therein, and it is the duty of governments to uphold them. Therefore, respect for central bank 
independence is an obligation binding both governments and monetary authorities. However, despite the 
existence of that autonomy, central banks are also expected to work in consultation with governments; 
and account for their actions before relevant authorities. 
 is a process that follows strict rules, and 
requires certain standards of macroeconomic variables, such as an increase in production or maintenance 
of full employment, otherwise, the purchasing value of the currency would depreciate; and the primary 
objective of central banks would miss its target. 
The analysis of this concept is the main objective of this short dissertation. Its purpose is to explore the 
legal dimension of the independence of central banks, bearing in mind that the nature of the topic, and the 
areas in which these institutions operate are interdependent; this is why this study will build on the views 
of economists, financial experts and lawyers. In fact, both lawyers and economists play an important role 
in the economic regulatory process. Their close cooperation is useful in the formulation of wise and 
effective regulations. 
Consequently, this dissertation will be tackled within an interdisciplinary perspective because mercantile 
law in general and banking law6
                                                          
4  Ibid. 
 in particular deals with legal aspects of finance, economics and business. 
5 A currency is a potent symbol of a polity’s unity, integrity and perhaps strength. Governments interfere with it at 
their peril (Cranston op cit (n 1) 118).  
6 The law is usually subdivided into two categories, namely public and private law. Public law is that part of law 
which regulates the legal relationship between the State and a subject in which the State acts from a position of 
authority, whereas private law regulates the legal relationship between legal subjects acting on a basis of equality. 
Areas of the law, which in particular are related to trade and commerce, are classified as mercantile law. Some 
 3 
In chapter one, a brief reference to the historical background of central banking in general will give an 
insight into the topic. In chapter two, the general theory of the independence of central banks will be 
considered. The third chapter will deal with the legal independence of the South African Reserve Bank 
(hereinafter called the SARB or the Bank). The concluding remarks will sum up the main ideas developed 
in the dissertation.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mercantile subjects consist largely or entirely of private applied law, for example, the law of partnership and 
insurance law, while others such as tax law are mainly public; company law is an example of mercantile law 
comprising both public and private rules. Banking law is presented as a mercantile law subject and regulates both 
public and private relationships. Public banking law regulates the legal relationship between banks and organs of 
the State, which are in a position of authority, and comprises those legal rules which make provision for control by 
the State of money and activities of banks in particular (An Oelofse UNISA Study Guide Mercantile Law LML-
407-U LWB 7-9 Banking Law and Usage (2002) 4-5).  
With regard to public banking law, Cranston remarked that ‘banking lawyers have taken little interest in central 
banks. Central banking law, at least in the common law countries, has been regarded as a specialized subject, 
mainly for public lawyers. But public lawyers have generally done little, although the debate about the European 
Central Bank is generating a great interest on their part. There is hardly any literature about central banking’ 
(Cranston op cit (n 1) 117). This probably may explain the reason why a number of economists have ventured into 
dealing with the independence of central banks, some with wonderful contributions and others with economic bias.  
However, given the nature and object of central banks, it is also not easy for lawyers specializing in this area, not 
to borrow from economic history, economics and finance to substantiate some legal concepts. Similarly, it is not 
possible for a lawyer involved in banking supervision to ignore the concepts of corporate finance, financial 
engineering (financial innovation) and corporate governance. However, even though the language used in their 
writings may have a smack of economics; finance and commerce, the overall of their literature is expected to have 
a legal perspective.  
Concerning the expansion of banking law, in South Africa, there is a significant literature on banking law in 
general;, and an impressive development of private banking law both in academic writings and judge made law. 
This is probably due to the fact that many legal experts are in agreement with the opinion expressed by Schulze 
that among the phenomena influencing banking law, there is the fact that ‘banking law is not an autonomous 
branch of the law; but rather an application of concepts and techniques of the general law of obligations’. (See, 
WG Schulze ‘The Source of South African Banking law- A twenty first Century Perspective’ (2001) 14 SA MercLJ 
Part I) 439). See also, FR Malan; JT Petrorius & SF du Toit  Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory 
Notes in South  African Law 4 ed (2002) 335. 
Therefore, the law of contracts being wide in scope, so becomes the law related to private banking law. 
Furthermore, Schulze, in describing the principles likely to exercise a decisive influence over the development of 
banking law, declared, inter alia, that other important considerations when studying banking law (…) are the 
fundamental changes taking place in the banking sphere which affect the economics of banking. Some of these 
economic changes, which may have an influence of the development of a future South African banking law, 
include the far greater competitiveness in the bank market and its products: increased asymmetric competition; 
excess capacity in the market and the far reaching impact of technology and financial innovation (ibid). 
With regard to public banking law, as above described by An (or simply,  Oelofse, no initials or firstname is 
necessary when referring to an author for a second time, unless there is more than one author with the same 
surname.) Oelofse, there are also a number of lawyers who have written on public banking law, mainly, in the area 
of banking supervision, money law, money laundering, legal aspects of financial institutions, etc. Therefore, the 
remarks of Cranston (supra), which were relevant some years ago;, and which may still prevail in some other 
countries, may not necessarily apply to South Africa as such. 
 4 
CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY AND CENTRAL BANKING 
1.1.1 Role of money in society 
Walter Rogers, an American humorist, once said ‘there have been three great inventions since the 
beginning of time: fire, the wheel and central banking’.7 He certainly forgot the invention of money 
around which central banking systems revolve.8 In fact, at all times, money has occupied a central stage 
in people’s lives. History tells us that money has been linked to religion and, in ancient times, the Romans 
banked in the temples of the goddess Juno, also called Moneta9, the Latin root of the word money.10 This 
practice carried with it another religious dimension in that Roman coins were minted in temples,; and 
sanctified by the priests, an act that made the currency acceptable by society as a reality.11 In this regard, 
Voet also declares that it is well known that ‘the Romans often deposited their things for safe keeping in a 
holy temple… sometimes with bankers and money changers’.12
Similarly, money has become an object of almost universal veneration. Some people are convinced that 
money makes everything possible, and this is probably true if one considers its value of exchange and the 
material enjoyment it brings to those who own it. Consequently, the place it holds in social relations 
explains the need for societies to seek its protection and stability. In this regard, it has been said that 
‘there are few things more important to society than stable money,; and efficient and reliable means of 
transferring it from one person to another’.
 This is probably why banks have always 
been considered sacred institutions from the time of their creation to this day.  
13
                                                          
7 The Economist September 2000 80. 
 
8 In antiquity, money took the form of ornaments, household utensils and tools. In Egypt, circa 2000BC rings, 
anklets, necklaces and bracelets were used extensively as a common means of exchange. The legendary King 
Croesus of Lydia in Asia Minor is generally credited with the honour of introducing a formal and sovereign 
coinage system when official silver and gold coins were struck in his kingdom between the years 560 to 546 BC. 
In Athens, coins were apparently introduced by Solon (638-559) who fixed money payment for fines and dues 
formerly paid in cattle; probably before this time coins had been in use in China. (See, eg, Houston The 
Fundamentals of Money [1935]10; see also ‘Market Intelligence’ [2004] The Nairobi Business and Financial 
Journal 28). 
9 The most important goddess of the Roman state, wife of Jupiter; she was originally an ancient Italian goddess; the 
Greek equivalent is Hera (Jidy Pearsall & Patrick Hanks (eds) The New Oxford Dictionary of English [1998]) 
992. The Latin term moneta came to signify money.you have already mentioned this in the text to foot note 10 
10 Robert W Kolb & Ricardo J Rodriguez Financial Institutions and Markets 2 ed (1996) 38. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Nigel Willis Banking in South Africa (1981) 184. 
13 Guy David ‘Money in Canadian Law’ (1986) The Canadian Bar Review 192. 
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In effect, money is the common denominator in several human transactions, and the means of discharging 
the obligations thereby created.14 From barter to counter-trade, its modern form, people use money as a 
medium of exchange to facilitate transactions,15 as a unit of account which helps determine with precision 
the value of the goods exchanged;, and the services delivered. Money is also a store of value equal to or 
near its face value.16 In this regard, money is any medium, which in practice fulfils the function of 
exchange and which is accepted by those who use it.17 This is why ‘money has evolved from cowrie 
shells (in South Pacific Islands) to cattle (in Africa) to cigarettes (in prisoner-of-war camps) and then to 
gold’.18
As history continues to say, the increase in the volume of trade transactions in ancient times gave rise to 
the need for people to have a safer place to keep their money other than in their homes. In this connection, 
it is said that ‘recourse was hard to some individuals, such as, priests, and wealthy merchants to keep it 
for them in the vaults they had for the safekeeping of their own gold’.
 Among all these forms of money, only gold was easy to handle, divisible and durable; thus it was 
preferred to other kinds of money. 
19
1.1.2 Emergence of central banking 
 The movement led to various 
associations of individuals or legal entities to form banks. From the activities of those banks, which were 
commercial in nature, came the idea of a central banking system that is examined below.  
A central banking system is a recent phenomenon when compared to commercial banking system. 
Commercial banking system is believed to be much older. Its beginning may be traced back to 
somewhere in the Middle Ages, from the European institutions that provided depository safekeeping 
services when, as seen earlier, the goldsmiths and silversmiths having facilities in which to keep their own 
valuable inventories, found that ‘they could earn additional income by storing valuables for a fee’.20
By contrast, the emergence of central banks is located somewhere in the 17
  
th century.21
                                                          
14 Ibid. 
 These banks were 
essentially created to assist their governments with finances. For example, the Bank of England Act 1964 
15 David S Kidwell, Peterson & Blackwell Financial Institutions, Markets and Money 7 ed (2000) 5. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See, Guy op cit (n 13) at 205. 
18 Jerry Jordan ‘Money, Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Global Financial Arena’ (2001) FMF 
Mnograph 27 15. 
19 See, Oelofse op cit (n 6) 22. 
20 Kolb et al op cit (n 10) 404. 
21 Sveriges Riskbank of Sweden was created in 1668; it was followed by the Bank of England in 1694, the Bank de 
France in 1800, the Bank of the Netherlands in 1814, the National Bank of Belgium in 1850, the Bank of Spain in 
1856, the Bank of Russia in 1860, the Bank of Japan in 1882 (Rene du Plessis ‘The Structure and Operations of 
the Reserve Bank and its Relationship with the Government’ (1984) BM 86-93. See also Jeremy Leaman The 
Bundesbank Myth Towards the Critique of Central Bank Independence [2001] 52). 
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authorized the incorporation of the Bank by means of public subscription. Originally, the object of the 
Bank was to raise money required by the war with Louis XIV.22 It is further said that ‘the Bank was 
prohibited from engaging in general trade but was authorized to deal in bills of exchange and in the 
equivalent of promissory notes’.23 The duties of that bank included keeping the accounts of the 
government, issuing banknotes and were also allowed to trade in gold coins, bullion and sliver.24
As private institutions, central banks were created as independent bodies. With time, a number of 
countries, which were satisfied with the way they were handling money, came to realise that they could 
also play a macroeconomic role.
 
25
Furthermore, because of their expertise, they also began to serve as governments’ advisors on financial 
matters. With these new roles, central banks went from strength to strength, which is why it was said that 
‘never before, have central banks reached the pinnacle position and obtained the widespread interest they 
now command’.
 As a result of this realisation, some of them have been entrusted with 
the handling and protection of currencies on behalf of governments. As their function grew in importance, 
central banks were also given the power to formulate monetary policies on behalf of governments. In 
addition to this, they received additional duties, such as, supervision of banks and other financial 
institutions. 
26 It is owing to their role in macroeconomic policy that they are now the focus of a great 
number of researchers in different fields.27 This movement was probably due to financial global 
expansion.28 In fact, since 1973, almost all the nations in the world have been operating fiat monetary 
systems29 in which the goods and services value of a unit of money rises or falls with the parsimony or 
profligacy with which the central bank issues its money.30
                                                          
22 EP Ellinger, Eva Lomnica & Richard Hooley Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law 4 ed (2006) 29.   
  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 When central banks were created, the notion of macro economy as such had not yet appeared. 
26 GM Wessels ‘Cycles in Central Bank independence’ (1997) 12 The South African Journal of Economic History 1 
153.   
27  See, GM Wessels ‘On the Meaning of Central Bank Independence’ (1998) 1 South African Journal of Economic 
and Management Sciences 2 254. 
28
 The global expansion was characterised by the expansion of the European Monetary Union, the former Eastern 
Bloc States, Chile, UK, France, New Zealand and a number of other countries where central banks statutes have 
been amended or completely revised in order to strengthen their independence. The independence of central banks 
received attention in South Africa during the constitution-making phase in that independence was debated and 
eventually included in the Constitution (Jordan op cit  (n 18) 1).  
29 Fiat money is paper money that is backed only by the issuing government’s decree that it is acceptable as legal 
tender currency. Its value stems from public confidence rather than being convertible into gold or other hard 
currency (Thomas Fitch Dictionary of Banking Law 3 ed (1997) 182). Legal tender is the money recognised by 
law as acceptable payment for creditors also called lawful money (Fitch op cit (n 29) 261). It is the money people 
use in their daily businesses, such as banknotes and coins. For further details, see section 17 of the South African 
Reserve Bank Act 89 (Act 90 of 1989) as amended. 
30  Jordan op cit (n 18) 27.  
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This helps maintain the balance in the money supply.31 Nations today no longer provide an anchor to their 
currencies by a legislative declaration of gold value. Therefore, central banks have themselves become 
anchors for the stability of their respective currencies.32 It is on the basis of these considerations that, 
nowadays, a central banking system is entrusted with the duty of formulating and implementing financial 
policies with the ultimate end of protecting the value of the currency and fostering economy. This crucial 
role has resulted in central banks being included by the will of the peoples in the well-cherished values at 
the same level as national symbols, such as flags, national anthems, systems of governments and Bills of 
Rights in constitutional dispensations. It is also because of the claim of national ownership by central 
banks, in some countries, that the appointment of the leadership of those institutions is strictly scrutinised, 
and carried out by governments, sometimes, with the approval of parliaments. All these legal and 
administrative precautionary measures have been designed to avoid any subordination of those 
institutions to governments; because it could facilitate inflation and even hyperinflation,33
 
 which are 
considered a threat to the life of any currency. The theory of the independence of central banks highlights 
this concept even more. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31  The central banking wisdom is that there should be neither too much money in circulation nor too little (see, 
David Colander Economics 1 ed (1994) 278). Central bankers are expected to keep the balance according to the 
moods of the economy.    
 32  Jordan op cit (n 18) 15. 
 33  Inflation is a continual rise in price level. It is also a continuous decline in the value of the money.  Inflation is an 
ongoing rise in the price level; a rise generates another rise in an exponential manner and the spiral is hard to 
stop. Once inflation hits 5 or 6% it is no longer insignificant, inflation of 10% (double digit) or more is 
significant and once it hits triple digits of 100 or more it is called hyperinflation (see, Colander op cit (n 31) 
149). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 THEORY ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF CENTRAL BANKS 
The term ‘independence’ is defined as a state of being free of influence, guidance or control of another or 
others. To be independent is a state of being free from outside control; not depending on another 
authority.34 To be independent is also to act personally without external pressure. Within the context of a 
central banking system, this means autonomy from government.35 It is a restriction made on governments 
against interfering with the handling of monetary policies. In fact, granting independence to central banks 
essentially represents elevating monetary policy to a more consecrated level beyond the fray of politics.36 
As noted previously, since some people think that political interference in the implementation of 
monetary policies weakens the credibility of central banks by restraining their ability to perform in a 
predictable and sound manner, their independence means freedom to execute monetary policies without 
fear of any political retaliation; otherwise, the entrenchment of that independence in constitutions would 
be meaningless. In this regard, it was said that ‘empirical evidence has shown that countries with an 
independent central bank enjoy a low inflation rate and small budget deficit without at the same time 
exhibiting reduced economic growth’.37
In order to strengthen this independence, it has continuously been thought that the power to create 
money,money and the power to spend it should be separated for central banks to operate as a check on 
governments, particularly over its fiscal policies;, and prohibiting the financing of government deficit. In 
this regard, the idea of separation between monetary authorities and governments was mooted in the 19
 
th
                                                          
34  Pearsall op cit (n 9) 928. 
 
century even though its application has taken a long time to gain wide recognition. This will be explained 
in the following section. 
35 The anomaly of the independence of central banks is illustrated by Sayers, who states that the authority of the 
State over the central bank is always necessarily absolute. All that is open to question is the extent to which the 
sovereign body should detail its command to the central bank for the monetary laws are such a command (Gianni 
Tiniolo in Tiniolo (ed) Central Banks’ independence in Historical Perspective (1988) 42). To make sure that this 
command will be obeyed, the Governor of the Central Bank of England and the government negotiated a deal of 
allegiance, which provides that ‘as long as I am the Governor of the Bank, I shall do my utmost to work loyally 
and harmoniously with you and for you as a Chancellor of the Exchequer;, and I shall continue if you allow me 
to tender you such advice as I consider it my duty to offer, fully realize that I must not attempt to impose my 
views on you’ (ibid). This is an example of a bank, which really had its hands tied and was under the direction of 
a Government. However, according to Ellinger, the election of a Labour government in 1997 resulted in two 
momentous changes in banking regulation. First, the Bank of England Act 1998, as well as giving the Bank 
independence in determining monetary policy, also transferred its responsibility for banking regulation to the 
Financial Services Authority (the ‘FSA’). (See, Ellinger et al op cit (n 22) 28). Therefore, the Bank, which was 
nationalized in 1946, and ever since subject to government control, has now recovered its independence.  
36  Ignacio Mass Central Bank Independence, A Critical View from A Developing Country Perspective (1994) 4-5.  
37  Markus Lusser ‘Autonomous Monetary Policy in a Small Country’ (1994) 13 South African Journal of Economic 
and Management Sciences 3. 
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2.1.1 Hallmark of central bank independence 
A distinctive feature of independence of central banks, namely autonomy from governments and non-
financing of budgets, was identified by one of the famous British economists in a paper on the 
establishment of a national bank in England in 1824 in which he stated that ‘the government could not be 
entrusted with the power of issuing paper money that it would most certainly abuse it’.38 For him, to avert 
the danger, commissioners should be allowed to control the use of public finance;, and should not 
authorize the lending of money to governments without proper justification; on the other hand, 
governments should not try to use their dominant power to convince the commissioners to do so. He 
further stated that ‘if the government wanted money, it should be obliged to raise it in the legitimate 
way’,39 such as applying wise fiscal policies or participating in financial markets like any other 
institution, but ‘in no case, should it be allowed to borrow from those who have the power of creating 
money’.40
It is clear from the above that the speaker had in mind a system of checks and balances in the financial 
sector, but his vision that the representatives of the peoples should have a final say in public financial 
management is somehow blurred by the current view that ‘although parliaments once exercised effective 
control of government budgets, today [in many countries], parliamentary control of government’s budget 
is a mere formality rather than a real check’.
 
41
The separation of monetary authorities will shed more light on this concept. 
 Because of this situation, the last hope of the people on 
these matters is placed in the role to be played by an independent central bank. Their expectation is that a 
central bank would not systematically finance deficits; rather, serious studies ; and consultations should 
be conducted to examine the merit of the requests of the government before any disbursement of funds is 
carried out. 
2.1.2 Separation of duties of governments and central banks 
Although the independence of central banks is topical in many countries, it is still a controversial issue. 
Those who advocate the idea of that autonomy tend to compare the legal independence of central banks 
                                                          
38
 BW Fraser Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin Central (1994) 1 www.rba.gov.au/publications and 
Research/Buttein/bu-dec94/bu 1294-1pdf. [Visited 4 May 2004]. This theory has been largely expounded by 
David Ricardo (1772-1823), a British economist and a successful  stockbroker of Dutch-Jewish parentage who is 
also credited with several other economic theories, such as the theory of wages in the economy and the theory of 
comparative advantage in international trade (see, Colander op cit  (n 31) 14, 113-114). 
39  Ibid. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Lastra op cit (n 2) at 77.  
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with the independence of the judiciary. The attempt to use this analogy as an example to separate 
monetary authorities and governments is probably by reference to the traditional system of checks and 
balances between the three traditional branches of power, namely the executive power, the legislative 
power and the judicial power as featured in several constitutions around the world. 
They probably view this mutual control where ‘no one branch can exercise power decisively without the 
support or the acquiescence of the other’42
Another reason, which may lead one to think that the independence of the two institutions is different in 
their essence, is the fact that central banks are part of the executive branch of the state. This is still true 
even in those countries that have opted to ensconce the independence of their central banks in their 
fundamental laws. The framers of those constitutions perhaps never thought that their central banks were 
meant to be the fourth estate of power. Even the press itself has never managed to be elevated to the level 
of a fourth power despite the freedom it enjoys;, and the role it plays in political orientation. 
 as an efficient mode in the conduct of monetary policies and 
another way of fostering decentralisation and avoiding the abuse of power. Although the analogy may be 
somehow self understood because in some countries, independence of the judiciary, and independence of 
central banks are entrenched in their constitutions, the reality is that independence of the judiciary is an 
almost universally accepted concept. On the contrary, the idea of central banks’ independence in 
constitutional systems is a new concept, which does not enjoy universal recognition. The reason being  
that  there are still a number of countries in which the principle of independence of central banks is not 
yet recognised, and where the idea is not even on the agenda of their financial policies. 
Therefore, it is not because the independence of central banks is provided for in some constitutions that 
central banks may consider themselves separate from governments. There are many other state agencies, 
the independence of which is written into constitutions, that are still considered administrative and 
advisory bodies, such as the Financial and Fiscal Commission or the Independent Authority to regulate 
Broadcasting as respectively stipulated in s 220 and s 192 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 108 of 1996; as well as similar institutions in many other countries around the world. 
Furthermore, it is true to say that the courts enjoy the authority of res judicata,43
                                                          
42 Thomas E Patterson American Democracy 5 ed (2001) 44. 
 which gives final 
decisions of the courts a binding character. By contrast, the decisions of central banks do not enjoy the 
43
 The complete expression is res judicata pro veritate habetur meaning that ‘a judgment will have a binding effect 
on another’ (Bryan A Garner (ed) Black’s Law Dictionary 8 ed (2004) 1337); it also means that the judgment that 
has been definitely decided is held as a truth and has a binding character (see, eg, Raymond Gullien & Jean 
Vincent Lexique de Termes Juridiques 5 ed (1981) 373). It is also called ‘judicial precedent’ and by way of 
generalization, judicial precedent may be described as a judicial decision that serves as example and authority for 
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same privileges because central banks, as administrative institutions, may be made to account to relevant 
institutions ; or seek consultation with pertinent administrative bodies. By contrast, the judges do not need 
such kind of consultation in their decision-making process.  
The view that the two forms of independence are different is shared by many; this is why it was said that 
‘the definition referring to a relationship between central bank and government which is comparable to 
the relationship between the judiciary and the government …’ is not helpful44 because this would entail a 
strict separation of powers in the traditional meaning of the word, which would amount to elevate the 
independence of central banks to a level of another power not recognized by law, the comparison simply 
‘suggests a degree of autonomy to be reserved to central banks’.45
From the above, it may be inferred that independence of central banks seems to be more administrative 
than political; administrative in the sense that its main objective is to reinforce the delegation of powers 
conferred on them in consistence with the principle of the division of labour, which consists of organising 
the financial sector into different constituencies to ensure greater efficiency and effectiveness in the 
management of the economy. However, as a general rule, governments retain the big role of conducting 
public affairs, and are primarily accountable for their actions to the peoples through institutions of 
control, such as parliaments in countries where the rule of law prevails; this is why it was said, ‘viewed 
broadly, an elected government in a democratic society has the ultimate power to formulate and 
implement macroeconomic policy and is also responsible for it’.
 
46
To achieve this end, there has to be a regulatory mechanism to avoid conflict and duplication of duties. 
This kind of delegation may be considered a routine matter in any administration or bureaucracy. It is 
sometimes discretionary, but in the case of central banks, the position is different because some of them 
derive their independence from constitutions or statutes of their respective countries. Thus, governments 
have no other alternative but to comply with law. The delegation is thus compulsory, but not 
 In practice, however, it is hard for 
governments to carry out all these tasks alone. Some of them are entrusted to other institutions; or state 
agencies provided those governments retain control, because, as it is commonly said, ‘delegation of 
power without control is improper’. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
deciding a later case, either by the same or by another court. In Latin concept of judicial precedent is embedded in 
the maxim of stare decisis et non quieta movere, meaning to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled points 
(see, Schulze op cit (n 6) at 447). 
44 Philip Brentford ‘Constitutional Aspects of the Independence of the European Central Bank’ (1998) 47 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 88. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Wessels op cit (n 26) at 255. 
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discretionary. However, this does not mean that central banks will cease to be closely associated with the 
general administration whatever their legal status and their degree of independence. 
Furthermore, one of the legislature’s motives in granting that independence is clearly to avoid the misuse 
of authority by governments by compelling central banks to adopt measures that may adversely affect 
their respective currencies  orcurrencies or impact negatively on their overall economies. 
It is beyond dispute that governments also have the interests of the people at heart; but they are comprised 
of human beings with all the weaknesses linked with human nature, for instance, the voters may pile 
pressure on them by claiming to cater for their needs at all costs, especially when elections are around the 
corner. In that event, when they cannot exercise self-restraint;, and resist the temptation of succumbing to 
those pressures, they may act in panic, and use public finance as a vehicle to regain their electoral 
mandate. To avoid this temptation, it was suggested that governments should draw a lesson from 
Ulysses47
Similarly, the legitimacy of independent institutions may also be understood by reference to the 
‘Robinson Crusoe’ paradigm. Just as an individual imposes constraints on himself in order to channel his 
own expedient behaviour towards rationally selected norms,
 of Greek mythology who decided to have his ears plugged with wax to avoid the temptation to 
hear the beautiful melodies of the sirens, which otherwise could have cost him his life.  
48 so a government limits itself by allowing or 
creating autonomous or independent bodies, recognising its own weakness in the face of temptation.49
Where such a restraint proves impossible, governors of central banks and their teams should be able to 
voice their disagreement freely when pressure to print money is unjustifiably imposed on them. In case of 
conflict, the dispute should be resolved by the relevant state agencies in total adherence to due process of 
law. 
 
Otherwise, it may tend to make decisions that exhibit inflationary biases;, and thereby undermine the 
legal independence of central banks. 
                                                          
47 Ulysses (also called Odysseus in Roman mythology) and his sailors plugged their ears with wax to be immune to 
the songs of the sirens which lured unwary sailors to their death. Ulysses asked the sailors to tie him to the mast 
to protect him from the temptation of removing the wax;, and when they were in the middle of the voyage, he was 
tempted to hear the songs and asked the sailors to assist him; his sailors followed his instructions and refused to 
remove the wax from his ears or to release him from the mast. His life was saved because he recognised his 
weakness and protected himself from it. Furthermore, experience teaches that cherished values may be put in 
jeopardy by the passion of the moment. Ulysses tied his own hands but constitutions bind present and future 
generations; a constitution is an attempt by a society to tie its own hands to limit its ability to fall prey to 
weaknesses (see, Erwin Chemerinsky Constitutional Law Principles and Policies 1 ed (1997) 7). 
48  Lastra op cit (n 2) at 479. 
49  Ibid. 
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However, despite the autonomy of central banks, as observed earlier, it is also stressed that ‘an 
independent central bank is not an omnipotent institution devoid of supervision and accountability but a 
part of democratic society’.50 As such, there are limits to its powers and restrictions on the scope of its 
discretionary policy.51 Independence for a central bank does not therefore mean that the bank occupies the 
position of a state within a state; it is impossible to have two sovereign authorities in a single state.52 The 
economic policy of a country cannot be anything but the policy of the elected people.53
In the same vein, it was also said that, ‘although governments have the final say in the management of 
their countries, and none has granted absolute independence to central banks, governments do grant or 
delegate monetary powers to central banks’.
  
54 As the argument goes ‘a mandated independence means 
that the bank is insulated from day to day political interference and short term affinity.55
It is also useful to mention that, even in those countries where the independence of central banks is not 
provided for in constitutions, they are somehow granted charters giving them a certain autonomy allowing 
them to conduct monetary policies in a more relaxed atmosphere, ; and some of them have had impressive 
inflation records. In this regard, it may be said that the success of central banks depends much on an 
effective leadership. For example, Margaret Thatcher was persistently hostile to statutory independence 
for the Bank of England; but under her rule, inflation was kept at a reasonable level.
 
56 This happened 
when there were divergent points of view with her long-serving Chancellor Lord Nigel, who was a keen 
advocate of independence for the Bank of England.57
From a historical point of view and observation, some experts believe that the role of the legal 
independence of central banks rose and declined with the application of economic ideologies, which 
originated from England and expanded to some other parts of the world, as briefly expounded below.  
  
2.1.3 Central bank independence with economic ideologies 
 
According to economic history, there are two important economic theories with regard to how the British 
government approached the conduct of economy in the past and contemporary period; namely classical 
                                                          
50 Wessels op cit (n 26) at 155. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56
  H Preece ‘Right to be wrong’ (1993) 57 Finance Week 10 8.   
57
  Ibid. 
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economy, spearheaded by Adam Smith (1723-1790) under the doctrine of laisser faire;58 and 
interventionist economy developed by John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946). 59
 
 These two concepts have 
had an impact on the legal independence in countries, which applied them beyond the United Kingdom. 
From the above, the perception of many financial experts and economists is that there is no big difference 
between the doctrine of laisser faire long time considered the embodiment of the system of capitalism and 
the basis of freedom of contract and the economic philosophy of interventionalism. Their conclusion is 
based on the fact that Smith does not totally rule out the intervention of government in the management of 
economy,; and Keynes also recognizes the interplay between the forces of the market; as well as a system 
of market oriented economy. However, there is a middle-of-the road theory, essentially developed by the 
so called classic economists,60
 
 and which, currently, is claimed by those who profess it to be the most 
suitable for the conduct of economy  despite its being still controversial in the eyes of many others. 
                                                          
58 In economics and politics, laisser faire (let alone) is a doctrine that economic system functions best when there is 
no interference by government. It is based on the belief that the natural economic order tends, when undisturbed 
by artificial stimulus or regulation, to secure the maximum well being for the individual and therefore for the 
community as a whole (see, Paul Lagasse et al (eds) The Columbia Encyclopedia 6 ed (2000) 1574). Historically, 
laisser faire was a reaction against mercantilism, a system of commercial controls in which industry and trade, 
especially foreign trade, were merely seen as means of strengthening the state. Navigation laws, trade 
monopolies, taxes, paternalist regulations of all kinds bore heavily upon the rising class of merchants in the 
period of European colonial expansion. It was on behalf of this class that the French PHYSIOCRATS, pioneer 
economists in 18th century first formulated the principle of laisser faire. With the physiocrats, state non 
interference became a cardinal teaching; they especially opposed the taxation of commercial pursuits. 
Opposition to mercantilism and state paternalism also motivated Adam Smith, father of classical economics, 
whose name, more than any other, is connected with the British laisser faire doctrine, which he developed after 
his stay in France. Smith believes that individual welfare rather than national power was the correct goal; he thus 
advocated that trade should be free of government restrictions. When individuals were free to pursue self interest, 
the invisible hand of rivalry or competition would become more effective than the state as a regulator of 
economic life. Smith did not believe in laisser faire in an absolute sense; he found a place for government in 
public works, such as the building of canals and docks to facilitate trade and in the regulation of foreign 
commerce to protect certain home industry (ibid). 
59 Some centuries later, another English economist and monetary expert, Keynes John Maynard (supra) came up 
with another theory, which was perceived as departure from classical economy. His position dated from the mid 
1920s, when he formulated the Liberal Party program to promote employment by a program of government 
spending on public works. Keynes came to believe that such a program would increase national purchasing power 
and foster employment in complementary industries. For the sake of full employment, Keynes also modifies the 
classical belief in international free trade. The basis of his doctrine is mainly based on large scale government 
economic planning and the intervention of government in the regulation of economic activities. His doctrine 
appealed to both practical politicians and theoretical economists with equal force; perhaps because he attacked the 
problem of employment and income while remaining faithful to the requirements of rigorous economic thought. 
Although he favored controlled investment and an active public sector, he never waived his faith in capitalist 
economy. In Keynesian theory, government action is designed to stimulate the market, not to eliminate it (see, eg, 
Lagasse op cit (n 58) 1524). 
60 Since the two ideologies exposed above have some convergent points of view, the economists who accept Smith’s 
ideas;, and at the same also recognize some of the ideas of Keynes, are known as ‘Neo Classic Economists’ (see 
Colander op cit (n 31) 318). 
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With regard to independence of central banks, this brief exposition of economic ideologies will help the 
reader understand that the position of those who favour that concept have continued to believe that central 
banks prevailed under the influence of the doctrine of laisser faire; while others think that, nationalisation 
or centralisation of main economic institutions and thereby the subordination of central banks to 
governments, were much influenced by the doctrine of interventionalism. 
 
In fact, a number of countries have been following these theories depending upon the party controlling the 
government of the day. To maintain financial stability, some of them have found that it was good to 
institutionalise a legal framework that permits governments and central banks to act in close cooperation. 
 
In this regard, a few banks have been randomly selected, without any inclination whatsoever  towards 
anyone of the ideologies exposed above, but to simply highlight the importance of granting legal 
independence of central banks in the conduct  of economic and financial affairs. 
 
2.1.4 The Bundesbank 
In Germany, the Central Bank is called the Bundesbank. It has a reputation as a fierce inflation fighter,61 
in large part because of the historical legacy of the German hyperinflation of the late 1920s and early 
1930s.62 Commentators and policymakers are almost unanimous on the fact that ‘the Bundesbank is the 
bastion for price stability and a symbol of monetary discipline around the world’.63 The anti-inflationary 
record of the Bundesbank is typically cited in literature as the quintessential example of the inverse 
relationship between inflation and central bank independence.64
The aim of stability, which became enshrined in the Bundesbank Act of 1957,
   
65
                                                          
61 David Colander Economics 4 ed (2001) 684. 
 was coupled with the 
strong desire of the German people to put an end to a financial crisis that was worsened by the burden of 
the war reparation debt. In their effort to revamp their economies, a series of measures were put in place 
among which the independence of the Bundesbank was prominent. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Maria Rosa Lastra & GP Miller ‘Central Bank in Ordinary and Extraordinary Times’ in Jan  Kleineman (ed) 
Central Bank Independence, The Economic Foundations, The Constitutional Implications and Democratic 
Accountability (1999) 12. 
64 Ibid. 
65 The German Constitution includes some dispositions about the Bundesbank, but does not mention its legal status 
or whether it will be a private or a public body. (See, eg, Felix Olkers Central Bank Law in German and South 
Africa, unpublished LLM dissertation University of Cape Town (1992) 1). 
Formatted: Font: Not Italic
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The success of the German economy in the above-mentioned period is also largely attributed to the 
combined efforts of the Bundesbank and its predecessor, the Bank Deutscher, which led to a period hailed 
as the miracle years66 during which stable high growth, low inflation, full employment and healthy 
external balances were realised and which was also called a magic square.67
This phenomenon is illustrated by the fact that from the lowest rate of growth in the 1950s, which 
hovered around 3.5 percent up to 1958, the year the Bundesbank Act came into force, the average growth 
for the decade was 8 percent and, for the sixteen years (1951-1966),
 
68 it was still an impressive 6.8 
percent. Inflation averaged less than two percent in 1950 to just one percent in 1960 and the rate of 
unemployment fell.69
There was widespread belief that the success was not only due to the legal independence of the 
Bundesbank but also, particularly, to the teamwork of all political, economic and financial institutions in 
applying positive policies and using top talents to achieve those results.
  
70
In this regard, it was declared that the Bundesbank could lend directly to the Federal and Lander 
governments only to a limited extent and only for a short period.
 This was further strengthened 
by German legislation on the monetary system, which included decisive measures to contain access by the 
state to central bank credit. 
71 The credit lines thus granted could be 
used only for cash advances, that is, to bridge short-term cash deficits that arise during the 
implementation of the budget, but not to finance deficit budgets themselves.72 This is reflected in s 20 of 
the Bundesbank Act, which sets a ceiling on the credit the Bank can grant to government.73 Moreover, the 
Bundesbank may not acquire bonds issued by public authorities direct from the borrower but only in the 
open market on the terms ruling there.74
                                                          
66 Leaman op cit (n 21) 114. 
 
67 In the United States, Humphrey & Hawkins Act on Full Employment and Balanced Growth (1978) translates this 
theory into reality. In fact, apart from the requirement of voting and implementing a balanced budget, the Act 
expressly requires the coordination of economic policy between the president, Congress and the Federal Reserve 
System;, and the setting of 3 percent adult employment as the official target for pubic policy (see, Robert B 
Carson Macroeconomic Issues Today Alternatives, Approaches 4 ed (1987) 180-181). Furthermore, the Act, as it 
stood by that time, explicitly required the nation to aim at four ultimate goals: full employment, growth in 
production, price stability, balance of trade and budget (ibid). 
68 Leaman op cit (n 21) 114. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See, eg, Leaman op cit (n 21) 113. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 See, Lastra op cit (n 2) at 490. 
74 Ibid. 
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In this effort of economic revival, the Bundesbank was also given a rule-making power, that is, it was 
permitted to issue regulations with a binding character through the principle of delegated legislation. 
However, the by-laws passed by the Council of the Bundesbank are subject to the approval of the Federal 
Government, and are published in the Federal Gazette. Therefore, by law, the Bundesbank has both goal 
independence (formulation of monetary policy) and instrumental independence (freedom in the 
implementation of the monetary policy). 
In order to strengthen teamwork, Germany has introduced an element, which is not common in many 
countries, that is, the cooperation between monetary authorities and the government in such a way that 
ministers who are in charge of economic and financial matters and monetary authorities are by statute 
obliged to act as close allies in the handling of economic and monetary policies. For example, the 
members of the Federal Government are entitled to attend meetings of the Central Bank’s Council, even 
though they have no right to vote; they can nonetheless propose motions.75 A reciprocal privilege is 
extended to the Governor of the Bundesbank.76
However, in this innovative style of seeking a synergetic action to achieve high results, ‘there is no formal 
liaison or interchange of staff members, but the Bundesbank and the Ministry of Finance work together 
closely in national and international bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund’.
 
77 This modus 
operandi is in line with the German Central Banking Act of 1957, which provides that ‘the Bundesbank is 
independent from the Government in the conduct of monetary policy; but it must cooperate with the 
Government’.78 Moreover, ‘the Bundesbank needs the Federal Government’s approval in order to 
participate in institutions serving the purposes of supra national policy or international payments and 
lending’.79
In the same perspective, there is another central bank that has achieved success in its own right. This bank 
is the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. 
  
2.1.5 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand was established in 1934.80
                                                          
75  Section 13 (2) of the Bundesbankgesetz. 
 At the time, it was under the tutelage of the 
Bank of England. The Reserve Bank was perceived as an essential tool in the economic development of 
the country and a subject of national pride. It was created as an independent institution under the 
76  Section 13 (3) of the Bundesbankgesetz. 
77  Lastra & Miller op cit (n 63) 488. 
78  Lastra & Miller op cit (n 63) 45. 
79  Ibid. 
80  Geofrey Wood ‘Central Banks independence’ in Jan Kleineman op cit (n 63) 10. 
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inspiration of the then Governor of the Bank of England.81 His idea was presented before the New 
Zealand House of Representatives. Some of the elements of the report are still topical today. The 
recommendations to establish a Reserve Bank were subject to two fundamental conditions. In the first 
place, the bank must be entirely free from both the actual fact and the fear of political interference.82
The Bank would not be able to discharge its duty if its room for manoeuvre were limited. Best practice in 
banking management has shown that to allow a bank to work as a private entity with its own capital 
owned by individuals or corporations with an autonomous board of directors appointed by the 
shareholders would allow the central bank to attain its objectives and realise better performance.  
 
The approximation to the framework of the advisor did not last long because of the advent of a new 
government. In 1936, the Bank was nationalised. The power of monetary policy as provided for in the Act 
creating the Bank Act of 1989 was put in the hands of the Ggovernment; the Bank had to execute the 
directives from the Minister of Finance. It was only in 1984 that the independence of the New Zealand 
Reserve Bank was revived. A series of reforms started to give the Bank back its lost powers. This was 
especially due to continued economic crises. In light of the German miracle, there was a general feeling 
that an independent central bank could better facilitate economic development in New Zealand. 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is currently regulated by the Reserve Bank Act of 1989 No. 157 as 
amended. This new legislation requires the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand to negotiate a 
monetary policy agreement with the Minister of Finance. Under this arrangement, the agreement must be 
made public. Under previous law, this requirement was not present; the Governor could be directed to 
follow a particular policy without that directive being released publicly. Currently, ‘the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand has the very specific goal of pursuing an inflation target of between zero and two percent’.83
This has helped inflation decline from double-digit levels to lower than two percent. Owing to this 
achievement, ‘the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is regarded as a forerunner in establishing institutional 
structures which ensure central bank independence with a formalized performance contract 
arrangement’.
  
84
                                                          
81 Otto Nieyemer was the advisor of the Bank of England; he subsequently became director of the Bank (1938-
1932). 
 In fact, its independence is in the form of a bilateral contract, in which the fight against 
inflation is the object. The Governor commits himself to meeting the targets agreed upon in the contract. 
If the set targets are not achieved, dismissal may occur.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Fraser op cit (n 38) 3. 
84 Jackson MKC ‘Reserve Bank Independence A Post Keynesian Perspective’ (2002) 70. The South African Journal 
of Economics 129. 
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To facilitate the execution of the agreement, the role assigned to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is to 
maintain price stability; other economic objectives are set aside. The Governor, in the implementation of 
this obligation, agrees that he will direct those under him or her towards the achievement of goals 
stipulated in the contract. In fact, he or she has no other choice because of the Sword of Damocles of 
losing his or her job, which hangs over him or her. 
Apart from the Bundesbank and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, there is another institution, which is 
also well known for its independence, namely the European Central Bank, an overview of which is given 
below.  
2.1.6 The European Central Bank 
In the late 1990s, a number of European Union countries formed a monetary union, creating a common 
currency called the euro and a new central bank called the European Central Bank (ECB).85 The primary 
objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability. Its tools and its directives are similar to those of the 
Bundesbank and some experts have considered it an expansion of the Bundesbank for the entire EU.86 
Like the Bundesbank, the decision to uphold that independence is provided for in the Maastricht Treaty.87 
This Treaty has made legal central bank independence a sine qua non for participating in the European 
Monetary Union. It was further provided that ‘in the discharge of its duty, the ECB does not take 
instruction from any quarter whatsoever within the Community’.88
Furthermore, that independence is laid down in the Treaty, member states are imperatively bound to bow 
to its provision. Like other countries, which adopted the independence of central banks in their 
constitutions, the main reason, as seen above, is the fact that they are hard to amend. In fact, to amend a 
multilateral treaty like the EC Treaty is as difficult as to amend any other constitutional provision.
 These provisions strengthen its legal 
independence.  
89 As 
seen earlier, ‘a constitution is the document in which the most important laws of the states are 
authoritatively ordained’.90
                                                          
85 Colander op cit (n 31) 684. 
 This is one of the reasons why it was declared that ‘the member states 
86 See, Colander op cit (n 31) 22. 
87 The Maastricht Treaty is a Treaty on the European Economic Union agreed by the heads of governments of the 
twelve member states of the European Community (Rome Treaty of 1957) at a summit in Maastricht (the 
Netherlands) in December 1991; the ratification was completed in 1993 (Pearsall op cit (n 9) 635). 
88 Ibid. 
89 See, Cranston op cit (n 1) 123. 
90 Brentford op cit (n 44) at 76. 
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undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies 
of the ECB or the national central banks in the performance of their tasks’.91
Consequently, the Bank has no legal or moral obligation to heed any manipulative measure from the 
Community in compliance with Article 107 of the Treaty. According to this treaty, the ECB shall not seek 
or take instruction from the Community or bodies from any government.
 
92 Likewise, the member of state 
is requested not to try to impede the decision-making body, the ECB or the national bank in the 
performance of their duty.93
With regard to the structure and independence, the European Central Bank being a new institution, had 
older institutions from which, perhaps, to draw inspiration, such as the Bundesbank;; but also other 
leading central banks in the world, such as the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States of America or 
the Reserve Bank of South Africa.  
 
Cranston, stressing the importance of  independence of central banks remarked, inter alia, that a central 
bank is in a strong position if its independence is constitutionally guaranteed because constitutions are 
generally speaking less readily amendable than statutes;, and in support of this idea, referred to the South 
African Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank as examples.94
Concerning public financial management, the strictest limit on a central bank financing government is an 
absolute prohibition; this is contemplated in Article 104 of the EC Treaty for the European Union, where 
any form of credit to member states or any other dealings are not allowed.
 
95
A part from the above described central banks, it has been indicated, right from the beginning,  that  the  
Reserve Bank of South Africa is among the first generation of central banks with an extra feature of being 
among the rarest institutions of this kind to have its independence entrenched in the Constitution. 
Therefore, its case will help enhance the comprehension of the topic under consideration as expressed in 
the following chapter. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
91 Cranston op cit (n 1) 123. 
92  See, Cranston op cit (n 1) 122. 
93  Ibid. 
94  See, eg, Cranston (n 1) 122. 
95  Cranston op cit (n 1) 130. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.1 THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK 
3.1.1 Brief overview of historical evolution 
The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 brought huge inflows of foreign capital into South 
Africa.96 This movement brought about a flourishing industry in the region. Because of this, and even 
before, there was a pressing need to organize a financial sector with at the centre, the creation of a central 
bank. The issue was raised several times in many and consecutive years, but every time, the Government 
would dismiss the claim as premature.97
In the long run, at the turn of the 20
 
th
During all those periods of unsuccessful petitions and discussions, one of the main arguments in favour of 
this claim was that ‘a central bank would ensure note circulation, more stable interest rates; trade would 
be fostered and only in times of crisis, a strong bank could serve the State and the public’.
 century, gold mining around Johannesburg had brought about the 
creation of a great number of enterprises in various areas of economic activity. This situation led to the 
creation of a stock of exchange,; and the emergence of a fledging banking industry, which made many 
business people and a number of financial experts to make a fresh call for the creation of a central bank to 
ensure financial coordination. This claim was also based on the adverse effects of the financial and 
monetary crisis, which had arisen in the aftermath of the World War I. 
98
                                                          
96 Financial Mail 30 August 1991 121 9 7. 
 There were 
already other central banks, such as the Bank of Netherlands, the Bank of Java and the Federal Reserve 
Bank in the United States. The existence of these banks contributed to the encouragement of people to 
continue with their agitation to have a central bank; on the other hand, there was also a general 
observation that almost everywhere where central banks had been established, they had stimulated their 
economies and stabilised their currencies. 
97 Gerhard de Kock A History of the South African Reserve Bank (1920-1952) (19 54) 3). 
98 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, at international level, a conference was held in Brussels in 1920 calling on all countries to 
establish a central bank to facilitate the restoration and maintenance of stability in their monetary and 
banking systems and to promote international cooperation.99
Finally, the Government decided to create a central bank, which came to be called the South African 
Reserve Bank.
 
100
Because of this achievement, South Africa prided herself on being ahead of Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand, who had still not yet established their central banks. The legal framework was modelled on that 
of the US Federal Reserve System
  
101, which had been founded seven years earlier, and on that of the 
Bank of Java.102
3.1.2 Creation of the South African Reserve Bank 
 An outline of the creation and structure of the SARB has more to tell.  
The South African Reserve Bank was originally instituted by the Currency and Banking Act 120 (Act No 
31 of 1920) with its seat of office in Pretoria where it commenced its business on 30 June 1921. This 
initial Act required commercial banks to subscribe to a total of 50 percent of the bank’s initial capital. 103 
In terms of the Currency and Banking Amendment Act 22 of 1923, however commercial banks were 
exempted from this obligation.104
 
 This Act was followed by a series of other Amendments, which 
culminated in the setting up of the South African Reserve Bank Act 89 (Act 90 of 1989), and which 
currently governs the Bank. 
The interim constitution, which came into effect on 27 April 1994, deals with the constitutional role 
played by the South African Reserve Bank.105
 
 After a long debate on whether it was convenient to put the 
provisions dealing with the Bank in the new Constitution; or alternatively, if it was to be provided for in 
an ordinary statute. The decision of the Constituent Assembly was that it should be entrenched in the 
Constitution and should be independent. 
                                                          
99 Malan et al op cit (n 6) 308 para 194. 
100 The South African Reserve Bank also goes by its acronym the SARB and which for the sake of convenience, will 
sometimes be referred to as such or the Bank in the present dissertation . 
101 As indicated earlier, the selection of the central banks to be included in this short dissertation was randomly done, 
and the nature and volume of the work could not permit the review of all central banks. This is how the Fed was 
not included in this work. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Oelofse op cit (n 6) 235. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Olkers op cit (n 65) 37. 
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This is how ‘the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996), which came into 
operation on 4 February 1996 (Procl R6 of 24 January 1997),106 confirmed in s 223 that the South African 
Reserve Bank is the central  bank  of South Africa’.107
 
 The independence of the South African Reserve 
Bank is stipulated in s 234 (2), which proclaims that the South African Reserve Bank in pursuit of its 
primary objective must perform its functions independently and without fear, favour or prejudice but 
there must be regular consultation between the Bank and the Cabinet member responsible for national 
financial matters. 
The primary objective of the South African Reserve Bank, as expressed in the preceding paragraph, is laid 
down in s 234(1) of the Constitution,; and is aimed at protecting the value of the currency in the interest 
of a balanced and sustainable economy. In this regard, it is suggested that this section should be read 
together with s 3 of the South African Reserve Bank Act 89 (Act 90 of 1989), in terms of which, the 
primary objective of the Reserve Bank is the promotion of monetary stability and balanced economic 
growth in the Republic.108 The same source indicates that these two sections are essentially the same in 
the sense that both intend to promote monetary stability in the interest of economic growth.109
 
  
The reason of keeping intact the Reserve Bank Act lies in the fact that the Constitution describes the 
objectives and functions of the SARB in broad and general terms leaving the details to be dealt with in an 
Act of Parliament as provided for in s 225. In all likelihood, the enactment of that Act could have 
followed the promulgation of the Constitution; but it is a constitutional practice that when there is a new 
constitution, the laws, which were in force prior to its promulgation, remain in force unless expressly 
repealed by a provision in the constitution. 
 
This is what happened with the South African Reserve Bank Act because s 242 of the Constitution makes 
provision for the preserving of all laws, which were in force immediately before the commencement of 
the Constitution. It also provides for an express abrogation contained in Schedule 7. Since the South 
African Reserve Bank Act was not in that Schedule, the proper construction is that: it was the intention of 
the framers of the Constitution to preserve its existence. This is why the new Constitution was put in 
place, but the missions and functions of the SARB remain the same.110
 
 
                                                          
106 WG Schulze & ME M Kelly Banking Law and Usage (LLM 407-U) Tutorial Letter 202/3/2001; Banking Law 
and Usage MBLW1-9(MBLW2-A0 Tutorial Letter 102/3/2011 (2001) 1. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 HE Formby & HT Cashmore ‘The Central Bank in the New South Africa’ 1994 Financial Mail  1333  96 5.  
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3.1.3 Mission, Powers and functions of the SARB 
 
3.1.3.1 Mission 
The term mission also means goal, target or objective; if one looks at the Constitution, the mission of the 
South African Reserve Bank is provided for in s 234 (1). This was later reaffirmed in legal literature that 
in 1990, the Reserve Bank issued a mission statement declaring in unequivocal terms that the main 
objective of monetary policy in South Africa, at all times, is to protect the internal and external value of 
the rand. In this regard, it was further said that the achievement of the mission is carried out through 
monetary policy, which ‘forms part of broader economic policy;, and just as in the case of other policy 
measures, its ultimate objective is the creation of maximum economic growth in a financially stable 
environment to improve the economic welfare of the total population of the country’.111
With regard to the constitutional obligation to maintain sustainable economy as expressed above, it is said 
that an economic growth is sustainable if it lasts, an economy should not be designed to boom and 
subsequently collapse. The Reserve Bank should neither fuel nor suppress economic development but 
should try to lay sound foundation to protect growth.
  
112  In addition, it was also declared that the Reserve 
Bank’s mission statement calls on the Bank to strive for financial stability as a medium term objective. 
Key element in such stability will indeed be a relative absence of both inflation and deflation of the 
general price level.113 In addition, as a general rule, almost all central banks focus on promoting public 
goals, such as economic growth, low inflation and the smooth operation of financial markets.114
Applying the rule within the context of the South African Reserve Bank, it is suggested that focus should 
be on: a moderate rate of expansion credit and the money supply, an orderly and well functioning 
financial market, an orderly payment and money transmission system with built-in safeguards against 
   
                                                          
111 Ibid. 
112 See, eg, Olkers op cit (n 65) 40. 
113 HB Falkena, LJ Fourie & WJ Kok The South  African Financial System ( 1995) 68. 
114 Robert H Frank & Ben Bernanke  Principles of Macroeconomics 2 ed (2004) 268. 
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systemic risk, and a system of sound and well managed banks and other financial institutions that are well 
versed in the monitoring of risks and in risk management.115
3.1.3.2 Powers and Functions 
   
The powers and functions of the South African Reserve Bank are those customarily exercised and 
performed by central banks, which powers and functions must be determined by an Act of Parliament and 
must be exercised or performed subject to the conditions prescribed in terms of that Act as given in s 225 
of the Constitution. 
For the reason previously stated, the powers of the Bank were already determined and  enumerated in s 10 
of the South African Reserve Bank Act 89 (Act 90 of 1989) as amended, and thus, the preservation of this 
Act fulfils the conditions prescribed in s 225 with regard to the Act of Parliament therein ordained. 
Furthermore, apart from these powers, s (11) and s (12) confer on the Reserve Bank powers of inspection 
with respect to banks and mutual banks.116
3.1.4 The structure of the South African Reserve Bank 
 
The structure of the South African Reserve Bank indicates that there is no significant change in the status 
of its initial ownership. The Bank is still a corporate body with its own assets and the right to sue and to 
be sued in its own name. The Reserve Bank, which was created as a public entity from its inception, was 
meant to play a non profit maximizing public interest role, and was established as such under the 
Government of the Union of South Africa. 
Contrary to some belief that the bank is privately owned, the fact that some commercial banks 
participated in its initial capital has not changed its status as a public entity. Even though at this stage, one 
could get the impression that the South African Reserve Bank was a semi autonomous or semi public 
institution, but what happened later, came to change the whole picture because, as indicated earlier, the 
obligation for commercial banks to participate in the capital was later relinquished, and the structure of 
the Board was modified as a result. In reality, keeping those commercial banks on the Board could have 
constituted an embarrassment to the Bank when it would try to discuss matters concerning them.  
Furthermore, the public character of the South African Reserve Bank is also reflected in s 34 of the 
Reserve Bank Act with regards to the allocation of the Bank’s surplus income after certain prescribed 
expenditures have been provided for and dividends from the net profits have been paid to the 
                                                          
115 HB Falkena et al op cit (n 113) 368. 
116 See, eg, Oelofse op cit (n 6) 238. 
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shareholders.117 This surplus is divided by allocating 10% of it to the Bank’s reserve fund and paying 
90% of it to the Government.118
In addition, the Reserve Bank, which was once described as a relative rarity among central banks because 
its stock was listed at the Stock Exchange of Johannesburg,
 
119
3.1.5 Administration of the Bank 
 is no longer active on this market because 
as from 2 May 2002, it has been delisted. 
The Bank is managed by a board of  fourteen directors, consisting of a Governor, three Deputy Governors 
(one of whom is designed as a Deputy Governor) and three others who are all appointed by the Minister 
of Finance and seven Directors elected by the shareholders (sect 4(1)).120 Of the elected directors, four 
represent commerce and finance, two industries, and one agriculture121 in the sense that they should be, or 
should have been primarily and actively engaged in these various pursuits.122 In this regard, it was further 
observed that ‘the board represents a variety of interests, which will induce the Bank to take all those 
interests into consideration in the formation of its policy and the board does not merely function as an 
instrument of the government’.123
Furthermore, in terms of s 4(2) (a), the Governor must be a person of tested banking experience. 
However, nothing is said about the rest of the governors in relation to their competence and experience. It 
may probably be implied that they should have suitable qualifications.  
  
To preserve the independence of the Bank, nobody may serve as a director if he is a director, officer or 
employee of a bank or a mutual bank, if he or she is not residing in the Republic, or if he or she is a 
Member of Parliament or a member of certain other government institutions as per s 4(2) (a) and s 4. It is 
also specified that no person shall be appointed or elected or remain a director if he or she is a Minister or 
a Deputy Minister in the Government of the Republic or if he or she is a Member of Parliament.  
Furthermore, like the Bundesbank, s 35 of the Reserve Bank Act gives the Board a ruling power to avoid 
bureaucracy of state machinery;, and give the bank flexibility to adjust its operations to changing times,; 
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and also act swiftly in the light of circumstances. This is another way of strengthening its administrative 
independence.  
 
Similarly, in order to achieve high performance in the discharge of its duties, the South African Reserve 
Bank is expected to apply modern techniques of corporate governance to make sure that the interests of 
all the stakeholders are accommodated, ; and are effectively protected in line with the theory of corporate 
law that ‘directors must consider and balance the interest of several constituencies, such as customers, 
employees, creditors, suppliers and the environment, each of which has a legitimate stake in the 
company’s development and activities’.124
3.1.6 Tenure and conditions of office of directors 
  
The independence of the central bank is an abstraction; the reality is the people behind it. It is therefore 
the duty of the law to protect them,; and determine how this independence will be translated into reality. 
One of the measures conceived is the security of tenure of the directors during the period of their office. 
As seen earlier, within the framework of the SARB, the Governor and the Deputy Governors hold office 
for a period of five years,; and the other directors hold office for a period of three years as stipulated in s 5 
of the South African Reserve Bank Act. A director is eligible for reappointment or re-election as the case 
may be after the expiry of his term of office (s 5(2)). This article read together with s 5(3) spells out that 
the directors (including the Governor and Deputy Governors) shall hold office upon such conditions of 
remuneration (including allowances) as may be determined by the Board, and upon such other conditions 
as may be prescribed by regulation. Some observers think that the security of tenure of the directors is 
still to be more clearly defined.  
For example, in the case of the Bundesbank, it is clearly stipulated that the members of the Bundesbank 
Directorate cannot be removed from office before the end of their term; except for reasons which lie in 
their person and if the initiative comes from themselves or the Central Bank Council.125 Concerning the 
period of tenure, the general observation is that ‘a long period of office may induce a lethargic 
management of monetary policy’.126
                                                          
124 Michele Havenga ‘Social Responsibility-Only a Company’s Duty’? (2006) 47 Codicillus 1 64. 
 But, it is also thought that governors of central banks should enjoy 
certain stability because it is argued that ‘rapid turnover of central bank governors indicates a lower level 
125 Lastra op cit (n 2) at 485. 
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of independence’.127
The protection of the Board members of a central bank is favoured by many; for example, some experts 
take the view that to protect the independence of  a central bank, the governor and the board of directors 
should be guaranteed a sufficiently long term of office.
 Therefore, it is not good to change central bank governors every time governments 
change. 
128 Furthermore, it is also maintained that ‘short 
terms of office could make them vulnerable to dim-sighted political pressure because of the uncertainty 
around the possible extension of their appointment’.129
Similarly, it is further observed that in some countries, there is a tendency for some political authorities to 
pick governors who will toe the line,; and act according to their wishes; and fire those who dare to 
legitimately challenge their decisions. This would amount to what Lastra calls appointment on the basis of 
patronage, which according to her, undermines the purpose of independence of central banks.
  
130
However, this issue has remained controversial; as some commentators take the view that ‘the 
independence of the central bank will be enhanced: if the governor is not appointed by government, the 
governor is appointed for more than five years, the board is not appointed by government, or if more than 
half of the board members are appointed independently of government and the board is also appointed for 
more than five years.
 If this 
situation were to be allowed to happen, the independence of central banks would remain a legal idealism 
while the situation is the other way round. 
131
While this general observation may sound correct in some respects, to be realistic, it may not always be 
possible to ignore totally the political aspect in the appointment of governors of central banks; as public 
institutions, most of time, they are anchored in constitutions or statutes of various countries; what is 
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needed is the possibility of selecting and vetting candidates from within or from without political circles; 
and appoint credible people with tested experience, high ethical standards and academic qualifications. 
3.1.7 Financial control and cooperation with the Minister of Finance 
As seen above, cooperation between the Reserve Bank and the Minister in charge of financial matters is a 
constitutional obligation, one of the duties of the latter is to ensure that the finances of the Bank are 
efficiently managed; to reach this target, the shareholders are entitled to elect two firms of public 
accountants to act as auditors of the Reserve Bank in terms of s 30(1) of the South African Reserve Bank 
Act; especially so because in terms of s 31 of the Act, the Reserve Bank also has a duty to inform the 
Minister of Finance about its financial standing. This is mainly carried out through its annual financial 
statements. 
In this connection, it is further maintained that any imperfection noticed in the management of the Bbank 
by the Minister of Finance may be drawn to the attention of the Reserve Bank and the Board, which are 
obliged to remedy the default. If the Board does not comply, the minister may apply to the Supreme Court 
for an order to compel the Reserve Bank to remedy the default in accordance with s 37 of the Reserve 
Bank Act 89 (Act 90 of 1989) as amended.   
In addition, the Minister of Finance may, at any time, cause an investigation to be made into the affairs of 
the South African Reserve Bank by one or more officers of the Department of Finance as per s 30(2) of 
the South African Reserve Bank Act. The providing of the information constitutes a kind of 
accountability by the authorities of the Reserve Bank to the Executive Branch of the State.  
3.1.8 Inflation targeting by the South African Reserve Bank 
The mainstream of experts in this area is in agreement that curbing inflation is not the only 
macroeconomic variable used to maintain growth and sustainable economy. However, they also recognize 
that it remains one of the major aspects of economic and financial stability. This is why many countries 
attach great importance on that. For example, the agreement between the Government of New Zealand 
and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is premised on inflation targeting. Similarly, the granting of 
independence to the Bundesbank was an attempt to fight against hyperinflation, which prevailed in the 
country. 
Furthermore, experts are also unanimous that inflation is a wild animal to be tamed by all means. Since 
central banks are generally entrusted with the carrying out of this task, it is therefore the duty of every 
governor with his or her team to meet the primary objective of their respective institutions. In this regard, 
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in the context of the SARB, it was declared that ‘within the framework of its anti inflationary strategy, the 
Bank has continued its practice of setting year to year target, now called guidelines’.132 Although these 
guidelines were informal in their nature, it appears that ‘South Africa formally adopted an inflation target 
monetary policy on February 2000 when the Minister of Finance announced an inflation of  three to six 
percent to be achieved by 2002’.133
The same source reveals that ‘this came as a result of a creeping inflation and an increase in external 
deficits that were to be brought under control through restrictive monetary policy’.
 
134 Even though this 
was a political statement, and not a legal enactment, nevertheless, it has had a positive impact at 
international level because currently ‘South Africa is categorized as an inflation targeting country135 and 
listed among the countries with full-fledged inflation policies’.136
3.1.9 Financing of deficit by the South African Reserve Bank 
  
 
Financing deficit of governments by central banks has always been a vexed issue, some experts consider 
that it should be prohibited at all cost, others estimate that it should be tolerated, but their common view is 
that it should preferably be avoided or in the event of extreme necessity, when other means have proved 
impossible, it should be strictly regulated. Within the framework of the South Africa Reserve Bank, it was 
said that the adoption of a more market oriented approach in implementing monetary policy in the 1980s 
led to the extensive use of public debt management by the Bank in close cooperation with the Treasury.137 
In this connection, it was also declared that the objective of debt management operations is to finance “the 
so called “deficit before borrowing and debt repayment” of the Exchequer in a non-inflationary manner, 
as well as to exert better control over liquidity in the economy.138
 
 
However, it is convenient to make it clear that funding deficit does not necessarily mean printing money 
because the general observation is that monetisation of government debt occurs when any deficit in a 
government budget is funded directly (normally by printing money) by the central bank. A deficit itself 
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does not therefore imply monetisation of government debt. For example, the central bank may use its 
reserves or recommend recourse to other means of outsourcing of the required funds to plug the shortage. 
In addition, the South African Reserve Bank holds current accounts for State departments and other 
government bodies and institutions.139 In this capacity, ‘it operates as a commercial bank for the State and 
its agencies. Instruments of payment from those institutions are collected and honoured by the Bank. The 
Bank grants loans and advances to the State’.140 It derives this power from s 10(f) of the South Africa 
Reserve Bank Act. Furthermore, the South African Reserve Bank acts as an agent and an advisor to the 
government.141
One of the ways often suggested is the raising of money in the open market; this practice entails the 
buying and the selling of government securities by the Reserve Bank in the open market at the Bank’s 
discretion in order to regulate the money supply or pattern of the interest rate.
 Therefore, it is expected that if the situation of funding deficit could arise, the Bank would 
be in a better position to advise the government to adopt proper financial structural adjustments in this 
sector. 
142 It is further explained 
that these transactions are called open market operations because the Bank is prepared to deal with any 
interested party.143 Although these transactions are generally [emphasis added] undertaken to achieve 
long term monetary objectives, a secondary objective may be to iron out temporary money market 
fluctuations caused for example, by agricultural crop financing, tax payment to the Exchequer or change 
in the net gold and other foreign reserves.144
Similarly, by way of comparison, in most industrialised countries, whether formally recognising the idea 
of the independence of central banks or not, it is said that ‘government’s access to borrowing from the 
central bank is governed both by central bank laws and regulations implementing them’.
  
145 A prohibition 
or limitation on financing the public sector’s deficits or monetising public debt is a classic indication of 
the economic independence of central banks.146 In addition, limiting the extent to which central banks can 
finance the government acts as a brake on the latter’s budgetary policies, and encourages economic 
rectitude.147
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For example, in Germany, the Bundesbank can intervene when the government is confronted with a 
temporary shortage of liquidity and establish the ceiling beyond which the Bundesbank can grant credit to 
government. While financing a deficit is the sovereign decision of every country, it is clear that there has 
to be a legal framework defining this practice. This avoids situations where deficits have led some 
countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, to a structural inflation almost impossible to absorb.148
Furthermore, it is believed that one of the reasons that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is pushing 
the cause of central banks independence among its member states is to encourage and maintain acceptable 
financial benchmarks and avoid funding inflationary budget deficits.
 
149
3.1.10 External Cooperation and debt management 
 
The South African Reserve Bank maintains internal relations with other central banks and international 
financial institutions especially the Institutions of Bretton Woods. For example, the Governor of the 
Reserve Bank is the South African representative on the Board of Governors of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), commonly known as the World Bank. One of the objectives of 
this institution is the encouragement of capital formation and provision of technical assistance to the 
developing countries.150
Likewise, it is also said that there is a close cooperation between the South African Reserve Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is generally concerned with financial arrangement and 
assistance within state members. The South African Reserve Bank is actively involved in regular 
consultations conducted by the Fund’s staff with South Africa as a part of their surveillance of member 
state economies. The Bank administers South Africa’s accounts with the IMF.
 This may perhaps constitute another source of getting money in the form of 
subsidies or loans to face temporary shortages of cash,; or turn the economy around in times of crisis. 
151
However, some critics have charged that the IMF has required recipients of its loans to follow economic 
policies, such as tight monetary policies and fiscal cut backs that have turned to be ill-advised.
 The same grants or 
loans, like the ones expected from the World Bank, may be provided in case of necessity. 
152
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receiving the loans, rather than the average person.153 The loan granted in 1998 to Russia was referred to 
as an example.154
In the same breath, the South African Reserve Bank also became a member of the Bank of International 
Settlement (BIS) on June 1971. The BIS was established in order to increase the cooperation between 
central banks and to act as an agent in respect of international payments.
 
155 The importance of this 
institution as a centre of international monetary cooperation and research has increased considerably 
during recent years. Within this framework, central bank governors meet regularly to exchange ideas,; 
and discuss about monetary current issues. Those meetings may sometimes culminate in joint action and 
in assistance to cope with emergency where it arises.156
3.1.11 The Financial and Fiscal Commission 
 This institution may also constitute another source 
of funding and a proper forum of exchange of ideas in the event of crisis. 
Generally, fiscal policy and monetary policy are two sides of the same coin. Although the Reserve Bank 
formulates and monitors money supply in the economy, the collection of taxes belongs to the 
Government. This is the reason why their harmonious cooperation helps combat inflation on several 
fronts, thereby preserving the integrity of the national currency and promoting economic growth as 
required by the Constitution. 
The Constitution of South Africa recognises this in ss 220-222 by creating the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission in charge of making sure the two policies converge in the efficient handling of financial 
matters. ‘It is also said that the Commission makes recommendations to both Parliament and the 
provincial legislatures. This removes the impression that people have that the South African Reserve 
Bank works in isolation from fiscal and other macroeconomic goals of government’.157
 
 The independence 
of the central bank in financing debt will depend on the outcome of the deliberations of the Commission.  
3.1.12 Accountability and transparency 
3.1.12.1 Accountability 
Before examining the accountability within the South African Reserve system, it is convenient to get a 
clear notion of the principle,; and see how it is applied in some other jurisdictions. In fact, accountability 
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is the quality or state of having someone to report to, or of being answerable to somebody. Someone is 
accountable when he or she has been given a free hand to do what he or she is required to do, but is still 
expected to explain his actions and decisions to an accounting authority. Within the context of state 
officials, accountability is the ability of the public to hold government officials responsible for their 
actions.158
One of the aspects of accountability is the formal duty to justify what has been done. In its Code of Good 
practice on Transparency (Section IV), the International Monetary Fund (2000) argues that officials of the 
central bank should be available to appear before a designated public authority to report on the conduct of 
monetary policy, explain the policy objectives(s) of their institution, describe their performance in 
achieving their objectives and as appropriate, exchange views on the state of economy and financial 
system.
 
159
Similarly, within the framework of the European Union, it is also observed that ‘although independence is 
one side of the coin, a central bank also must be accountable in a democratic state’.
 
160 It was further 
maintained that such accountability should be diversified, including both parliamentary control and 
control by the executive and judicial bodies.161
3.1.12.2 Accountability before executive organs of the state 
 
With regard to accountability to executive body, it is said that to avoid undemocratic state within a state, 
the central bank should provide certain information, reports and advice to the government upon 
demand.162 There are a number of countries where such accountability is applied, such as Germany, the 
United States, and the European Union. For example, the Maastricht Treaty stipulates that the ECB shall 
provide quarterly and annual reports, as well as weekly consolidated financial statements to EC bodies. 
These reports are to be made available to interested parties free of charge.163
3.1.12.3 Accountability before legislative bodies 
 
 
Accountability to legislative body means that the central bank should provide an ex post justification of 
its actions. Parliament would not be allowed to change decisions that are made legally, and therefore, its 
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supervision would mean that the central bank must simply account for its actions both before parliament 
and in front of the country.164
In the context of the Reserve Bank of South Africa, the exchange of ideas is generally carried out at the 
level of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee acting on behalf of the House. It may ordinarily result in a 
praise to the Bank if the representatives of the people are satisfied by the work, or a reprimand if they are 
not. Corrective measures may be recommended by the House and the Governor (who bears administrative 
responsibility) and the Minister of Finance (who bears political responsibility) cannot ignore them with 
impunity. 
 
3.1.12.4 Accountability to judicial institutions 
With regard to accountability before the judiciary, there is no Court of Auditors in South Africa, like it is 
the case in the European Union165
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; much of the Republic financial control is carried out by the Office of 
the Auditor General as per s 188 of the Constitution. Although there is no accountability before judicial 
institution, this does not weaken the capacity of control by Auditor General. In addition, in s 188 (2) (a) it  
 
165
  Within the context of the European central banking system, it is declared that ‘the judiciary should control the 
lawlessness of the Central Bank’s operations and decisions in the fulfillment of its functions. The Court of 
Auditors should control the accounts of the Central Bank in order to avoid lack of transparency, particularly if 
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that a judicial control system is necessarily better than the control effected by a General Auditor as it is applied 
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exercise of functions are open to the Supreme Audit Institutions of all countries, which are members of the 
United States Organization or any Specialized Agencies,; and the Supreme Audit Institutions of those supra 
national organizations, which are subject of international law,; and endowed with a legal status and an 
appropriate degree of economic, technical/organization of financial integration (ibid). In countries where courts 
of auditors exist, central banks, like any other legal entity in which the state has full ownership or is a leading 
shareholder, are audited by those courts;, and before the passing of the financial bills of the year, the reports of 
the Courts of Accounts are sent to Head of States or Governments;, and then presented to parliaments with 
ample coverage by the media for the pubic to be informed about the overall management of public finance (see, 
eg, Maurice Duverger op cit (n 65) 415). Judges at those institutions are mostly highly qualified and 
experienced former civil servants from the Ministry of Finance, experienced accountants and lawyers 
specializing in financial law. On top of ensuring the auditing of public accounts, those courts are also 
empowered to judge all public accountants with regard to proper handling of the funds in various ministerial 
departments. For example, in France, the Court of Accounts is a prestigious institution and it is provided for in 
Article 47 of the Constitution of 1958 as amended, which proclaims, inter alia, that the Court of Accounts 
(Court des Comptes) assists Parliament and the Government in the control of the proper implementation of 
public budgets voted every year. The main duties of the Court are to conduct financial audits of accounts, 
conduct good governance audits, and provide information and advice to Parliament and Administration (ibid). 
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is said that the General Auditor has jurisdiction on any institution funded from the National Revenue 
Fund or a Provincial Revenue Fund or by a municipality; or (b) any institution that is authorized in terms 
of any law to receive money for a public purpose. Furthermore, in terms of s 188 (3), the Auditor-General 
must also submit audit reports to any legislature that has a direct interest in the audit, and to any other 
authority prescribed by national legislation. In view of this, there are many common features in the two 
systems, and the end result seems to be the providing of information to the legislatures that represent 
taxpayers. Therefore, the above exposition of the functioning of courts of accounts is simply given in 
comparative perspective. 
3.1.12.5 Accountability and election of monetary authorities 
Accountability and transparency are closely related to democratic doctrines stipulated in most 
constitutions. A constitution defines different organs of a State and their mode of cooperation in the best 
interest of the people. When people vote for their leaders, they expect better services and visionary 
leadership. A leadership that is capable of building up strategies of prudence, promotes good governance, 
and upholds the rule of law; if they do not, they should be brought to account before the relevant 
authority. As such, ‘governments must first and foremost be held accountable by the people themselves in 
any given country’.166 It is also maintained that ‘people will have confidence in public institutions only if 
they can be assured of their honesty and of being served in a transparent manner, and if there are 
mechanisms through which they can hold governments accountable’.167
It is true to declare that in a representative democracy, the elected are responsible to the public, which 
holds them accountable, at least through the electoral process; a fact, which is not applied to monetary 
authorities. Consequently, there is a current opinion holding that those monetary authorities should also 
be elected and raise a number of issues; as one expert puts it ‘can it be right that a bank governor not 
elected by the people and not answerable to voters at all, has so much power over them and their lives?’
 
168 
It is not only in South Africa where the issue is raised; this was also the case in the European central 
banking system where it is reported that ‘the main argument against central bank independence is that an 
institution, which is free from the direct effect of political control, lacks democratic legitimacy’.169
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In South Africa, this issue was in the air before the existence of the Constitution.170 It still lingers even 
after the promulgation of the Constitution. This means that the issue still remains controversial;, and 
every group provides its own reasons for supporting or opposing the idea. The South African monetary 
authorities are aware of the criticism.171 The answer provided by some of them to justify their non-
election is once again by way of analogy to the judiciary; in this connection, it has been said that ‘some 
governmental agencies enjoy independence even though, in general, their members are not submitted to 
elections like politicians; there are plenty of other areas of national life where decision making is 
delegated to independent but unelected officials; the judiciary is a prime example’.172
Despite the legal independence of the Bank, the authorities are also aware that ‘independence does not 
mean lack of accountability’. According to some of them, ‘no central bank can totally be independent in 
the sense that it is not answerable to anyone’;
 
173 it is further argued that ‘even the most autonomous 
central bank has to report in some form or another to the legislature, which in any case has the ultimate 
power to change the laws governing the central bank’.174
Finally, while a country may make an option of a representative democracy in which the people 
participate in the decision making not directly but indirectly through the election of officials to represent 
their interests,
 Another perceived danger by those who are 
against electing them is the fact that elected monetary authorities may be subservient to people who have 
funded their campaigns instead of acting independently and transparently. 
175 not all institutions are submitted to this process. For example, under the American 
Constitution, it is declared that ‘the framers, after long debates over this issue, decided that federal judges 
and justices would rather be appointed than elected’.176 They would be nominated by the President, ; and 
confirmed through the approval of the Senate. Once confirmed, they would hold office during good 
behaviour. In effect, they would be allowed to hold office for life unless they committed a crime.177
While some current opinion holds the view that central bankers should be appointed, not elected;, and 
probably approved by parliaments, there is no example in the world where governors are allowed to hold 
their office for life like judges; rather, their tenure is of a limited duration; their professional guarantees 
 This 
is probably not the kind of guarantee sought for central bankers. 
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should therefore remain within that period. In the final analysis, it was also said that the judiciary should 
be more of a guardian institution.178
However, in general, there are some experts who think that there are still some shortcomings in the way 
the South African Reserve Bank is made accountable. In their opinion, the Bank should be given a legal 
framework that would lead to more accountability and transparency and that the South African Reserve 
Bank does not as yet prescribe a completely transparent framework for monetary policy
 Similarly, central banks may also be considered guardian institutions, 
with members probably not needing to be elected. Whether elected or not, what is expected from all of 
them is accountability and transparency as public trustees. 
179 on the grounds 
that ‘the Act does not specify what level of inflation offers sufficient price stability, and does not specify 
the benchmarks against which the performance of the South African Reserve Bank can be judged when 
called before Parliament’.180
3.1.13 Transparency 
 For them, the pronouncements of relevant monetary authorities on the level 
of inflation should be translated into statutory or administrative guidelines to give them a compelling 
character. 
In some financial or political literature, the terms accountability and transparency are used 
interchangeably, but while accountability compels fiduciary authorities to appear before relevant 
authorities and bodies, transparency is concerned with the reporting of essential information to the public 
so that people may know what is going on in their departments. The common perception is that people 
who are in charge of the implementation of monetary policies should not only keep account of their 
actions, ; but also provide some financial information. Within the framework of the South African 
Reserve Bank, the term transparency is a vital tool for fulfilling this accountability requirement. The 
rationale is that the essential actions and strategies of the South African Reserve Bank should be 
communicated to the public in general, and to its clientele in particular. In this way, it is thought that the 
South African Reserve Bank will be able to retain broader public support,; and will help the financial 
market operate more efficiently. 
In this regard, as seen earlier, pursuant to s 31 and s 32 of the South African Reserve Bank Act, the 
Governor must submit an annual report relating to the implementation of monetary policy by the Bank to 
the Minister in charge of national financial matters; at the same time, he must furnish detailed information 
to the Department of Finance and to Parliament concerning the financial activities of the Bank. Some 
information, such as statements of assets and liabilities, must be sent on a monthly basis. The Department 
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of Finance has a duty to publish every return received annually from the Bank in the Government Gazette. 
It is further stated that although the Governor sends his report to Parliament, the Minister must as well do 
so to Parliament; he must present a copy of the report sent annually to him by the Governor within 
fourteen days after its reception, if Parliament is then in ordinary session, or within fourteen days after the 
commencement of its next ordinary session as per s 32(3). By informing the people, the public can help 
shape up the formulation and implementation of delivery of monetary policy. This is a way to keep the 
public informed about the financial situation of the South African Reserve Bank and providing 
opportunity to the Government to monitor the activities of the Bank. The Government must make sure 
that the Bank acts within the limitation of the Reserve Bank Act.181
 
  
Conclusion 
This work has explored essential elements of the legal foundations of the independence of central banks 
in general, and the legal independence of the South African Reserve Bank in particular. The common 
denominator of the mission of central banks is to keep inflation under control. A central bank, also called 
reserve bank in some countries, is an institution in charge of monetary policy of a given country. The 
primary objective to achieve this is the maintenance of price stability; in other words, it is fight against 
inflation on a continuous basis. To allow central banks reach this goal, many countries have granted 
certain degree of autonomy by delegating some powers to them. In some others, such autonomy is 
reflected in constitutions, others in charters or statutes.  
The main idea of the independence of central bank is to invite the relevant authorities to exercise self 
restraint. These institutions must also make sure that there are no reckless and fraudulent practices likely 
to affect the stability of currencies of their countries. Central banks must also make sure that the 
borrowing by governments follows certain and clear criteria, and guidelines to avoid unnecessary 
expenditure. An overview of some institutions, such as the European Central Bank, the Bundesbank, the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand have been made,; and the maintenance of price stability is their main 
common denominator as well as the conduct of their activities with a certain degree of autonomy. But 
given the nature of the institution and state structure and functioning, the authorities of those institutions 
have a duty to cooperate with their respective governments for more coordination in this area. 
With regard to the South African Reserve Bank, its independence is rooted in the Constitution. This 
means that the people of South Africa have found this independence to be a value to be protected at a 
higher level, that is, the Constitution. This is especially due to the fact that the Constitution is not easily 
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amendable. In the event of any amendment, which is always possible due to the inherent constituent 
power of the people to change the Constitution as they think fit, there should be a compelling reason for 
doing so. In the same breath, the people should also make sure that the independence is effectively 
implemented and, at the other end of the spectrum, check whether the Bank has not abused that power. In 
order to make effective its independence, the Bank was given the power to formulate and implement 
monetary policy, while the Executive Branch of the State determines and implements fiscal policy. For 
harmonious functioning among monetary authorities, regular consultations are held between the Minister 
of Finance, the Governor and other relevant ministries. All these meetings on monetary and fiscal policies 
are coordinated and different opinions are taken into consideration for the smooth running of the overall 
economy. The legal independence of the South African Reserve Bank requires that the financial 
objectives should be clearly defined in law. The purpose of this clarity is to afford the South African 
Reserve Bank the opportunity to react efficiently when the economy sends wrong signals,; and thereafter 
come up with appropriate solutions in due time. The legal independence of the South African Reserve 
Bank also means that the Bank has its own structures, and is allowed to cooperate with the government in 
setting up its monetary targets as well as having the instruments to achieve them. It also signifies that the 
Bank will not be forced to finance budget deficits without justification,; and will be given latitude to 
screen and appoint highly qualified people to administer the Bank without any interference. 
The independence means that the Governors and the Board should have security of tenure during their 
mandate so that they may feel little political pressure, if any, in the discharge of their duties. The work has 
also outlined that the Bank is not a power within a power; it should be considered a guardian institution 
for the life of the currency and for the sake of a healthy economy. Despite its legal independence, the 
Bank is also expected to account for its actions before Parliament,; and it has a duty to report and 
communicate pertinent information to the public, bearing in mind that, in its capacity as a bank, it is also 
held to the banking duty of confidentiality in terms of s 33 of the Reserve Bank Act. It should not, 
however, hide behind this to withhold crucial information needed by different bodies. Although central 
banks are granted legal independence, the reality is that they do not operate in vacuum; they follow 
macroeconomic policies and targets set up by their governments; while the judiciary may take an 
independent position vis a vis the Ggovernment; it is not so easy for the Governor to take the same stand 
because the Constitution requires him or her to work in consultation with the government. 
The independence of central banks may be understood within the concept of the division of labour for 
efficiency and effectiveness. The Government and the Bank should work as close allies because both of 
them act as agents; the real masters are the people they serve. It has been shown that the legal foundation 
of the independence of central banks is either in constitutions, in charters or in other contractual 
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arrangements. In this regard, it is said that however elegantly worded or drafted, the legal stipulation may 
be dead letters if the government’s attitude or the general socio political climate do not support it. The 
(officially required) objective, recommendations and advice of the central bank will have no practical 
relevance if, in practice, they are not accepted by government. What is more important is a deeply rooted 
respect and a reputation for objectivity and technical competence on the part of the central bank to resist 
the pressure of political expedience.182
                                                          
182 See, Wessels op cit (n 26) at 262. 
 But whether a bank is independent or not, the reality is that it is 
not severed from the executive branch, which assumes the ultimate responsibility of the nation. 
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Appendix One: List of main abbreviations used in the work 
SARB    The South African Reserve Bank. 
ECB    The European Central Bank. 
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Appendix Two: List of main statutes 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No 106 of 1996. 
The South African Reserve Bank Act No 90 of 1989 as amended. 
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